Immortal Invasive Initiatives? The Need for a Genetic  Right to Be Forgotten by Hale-Kupiec, Thomas
Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology 
Volume 17 Issue 1 Article 8 
2-2016 
Immortal Invasive Initiatives? The Need for a Genetic "Right to Be 
Forgotten" 
Thomas Hale-Kupiec 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst 
 Part of the Food and Drug Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Thomas Hale-Kupiec, Immortal Invasive Initiatives? The Need for a Genetic "Right to Be Forgotten", 17 
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 441 (2016). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol17/iss1/8 
The Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology is published by the 
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing. 
Note
Immortal Invasive Initiatives? The Need for a
Genetic Right to Be Forgotten
Thomas Hale-Kupiec*
INTRODUCTION
In January 2015, President Barack Obama proposed
spending $130 million to create a population-scale study at the
National Institutes of Health (NIH).1 This study aims to create
a database containing health information with genetic, envi-
ronmental, lifestyle, medical, and microbial data from over two
million participants.2 This note proposes that as a result of re-
cent Supreme Court holdings eroding rights to personal privacy
and gaps in federal privacy and information laws, the United
States should consider adopting the European Right to Be
Forgotten3 solely within the context of genetic information.
The note begins by laying out the details of the Presidents
forthcoming Precision Medicine Initiative (PMI or the Initia-
© 2016 Thomas Hale-Kupiec
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Minnesota Law School, M.P.H.
Graduate, 2013, George Washington University. An extraordinary thank you
must be given to Professor William McGeveran at the University of Minnesota
for his advice and guidance on this note. Without him, this article could not
have been completed in a timely fashion.
1. Exec. Office of the President, Office of the Press Secy, Fact Sheet:
President Obamas Precision Medicine Initiative, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 30,
2015), [https://web.archive.org/web/20150202193803
/http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/01/30/fact-sheet-president-
obama-s-precision-medicine-initiative]; Kathy Giusti, Obamas Push for a
Huge Genetic Biobank, and What It Means for Your Health, FORTUNE INSIDER
(Jan. 30, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/01/30/obamas-push-for-a-
huge-genetic-biobank-and-what-it-means-for-your-health/.
2. See generally RICK CNOSSEN, ET AL., PRECISION MEDICINE MEETING
(FEB 11-12) WHITE PAPER: DATA COLLECTION AND MOBILE TECHNOLOGIES
(2015), https://www.nih.gov/sites/default/files/research-training/initiatives
/pmi/data-collection-mobile-technologies.pdf.
3. Patricia J. Williams, The Right to Be Forgotten, NATION, Oct. 6, 2014,
at 10, 1011.
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tive).4 This note then reviews why this use of information is
exceptional, relative to other forms of information, and explores
the relationship that DNA information has had with human
rights (from both a historical and a bioethical perspective).5
Next, looking to civil6 and criminal7 case law, this note analyz-
es current issues associated with an existing, centralized DNA
database. Finally, this note reviews the European Right to Be
Forgotten,8 and analyzes how this right may be useful in the
implementation of the new Precision Medicine Initiative. The
note concludes with a discussion of public health and public
policy arguments that would justify the Right to Be Forgotten
for this limited context.
A. THE PRECISIONMEDICINE INITIATIVE
In January 2015, President Barack Obama proposed
spending $215 million on the Precision Medicine Initiative.9
The largest part of the money, $130 million, would go to the
National Institutes of Health in order to create a population-
scale study.10 This study would create a database containing
health information with genetic, environmental, lifestyle, med-
ical, and microbial data from both healthy and sick volunteers
with the aim that it will be used to accelerate medical research
and to personalize treatments to patients.11 This databases
immediate purpose, as noted by the NIH, will be to significant-
ly expand efforts in cancer genomics to create prevention and
4. See Giusti, supra note 1.
5. See infra notes 23108 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 113143 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 144!170 and accompanying text.
8. Williams, supra note 3.
9. Exec. Office of the President, supra note 1; see Thomas M. Burton,
Jonathan D. Rockoff & Ron Winslow, Obama Announces $215 Million Preci-
sion-Medicine Genetic Plan, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 30, 2015, 7:48 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-to-lay-out-215-million-precision-medicine-
plan-1422615602; Antonio Regalado, U.S. to Develop DNA Study of One Mil-
lion People, MIT TECH. REV. (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.technologyreview.com
/news/534591/us-to-develop-dna-study-of-one-million-people/.
10. See Burton, Rockoff & Winslow, supra note 9; Regaldo, supra note 9.
11. See Nicola Davis, Obama Puts $215 Million Price Tag on Precision
Medicine Plan, BIONEWS (Feb. 9, 2015),
http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_493848.asp; Jocelyn Kaiser, White House
Fleshes Out Obamas $215 Million Plan for Precision Medicine, SCIENCE (Jan.
30, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://news.sciencemag.org/biology/2015/01/white-house-
fleshes-out-obama-s-215-million-plan-precision-medicine.
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treatment successes for more cancers.12 More long-term goals
include researchers understand[ing] how genomic variations
and other health factors affect the development of disease.13
Some physicians believe these objectives could come to fruition,
and subsequently, could offer more targeted, personalized pa-
tient care resulting in a healthier population,14 however other
physicians are skeptical, considering the findings of previous
government initiatives.15 Regardless of feasibility, though, the
political and financial components of this project seem to have
been established with little to no opposition.16
So why is there any concern over this project, when three
major patient protections in federal lawthe Common Rule,17
12. Near-term Goals: Expanding Efforts in Cancer, NATL INST. HEALTH
(Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.nih.gov/precisionmedicine/goals.htm.
13. Longer-term Goals: Advance Precision Medicine to All Areas of Health,
NATL INST. HEALTH (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.nih.gov/precisionmedicine
/future.htm.
14. Fred N. Pelzman, Making Medicine More Personal, MEDPAGE TODAY
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.medpagetoday.com
/PatientCenteredMedicalHome/PatientCenteredMedicalHome/49997 (Weve
all seen patients who live their entire lives with incredibly high blood pres-
sures, who never have a stroke, heart failure, kidney failure, or a heart attack.
Personalized medicine can potentially show us this: Which patient will devel-
op high blood pressure. Which patients are salt responsive. Which patient will
respond to which medicine. Which patients blood pressure, left uncontrolled,
will lead to end-organ damage down the road . . . . No one is going to be better
positioned to help administer this . . . than the primary care providers.).
15. Michael J. Joyner, Moonshot Medicine Will Let Us Down, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/29/opinion/moonshot-
medicine-will-let-us-down.html?ref=opinion&_r=2 (But for most common dis-
eases, hundreds of genetic risk variants with small effects have been identi-
fied, and it is hard to develop a clear picture of who is really at risk for what.
This was actually one of the major and unexpected findings of the Human
Genome Project. In the 1990s and early 2000s, it was thought that a few ge-
netic variants would be found to account for a lot of disease risk. But for wide-
spread diseases like diabetes, heart disease and most cancers, no clear genetic
story has emerged for a vast majority of cases . . . . We would be better off di-
recting more resources to understanding what it takes to solve messy prob-
lems about how humans behave as individuals and in groups. Ultimately, we
almost certainly have more control over how much we exercise, eat, drink and
smoke than we do over our genomes.).
16. See Id.
17. Federal Policy for the Protection of Human Subjects (Common Rule),
U.S. DEPT HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp
/humansubjects/commonrule/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2015) (The Federal Policy
for the Protection of Human Subjects or the Common Rule was published in
1991 and codified in separate regulations by 15 Federal departments and
agencies, as listed below. The HHS regulations, 45 CFR part 46, include four
subparts: subpart A, also known as the Federal Policy or the Common Rule;
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the Health Insurance Portability Privacy Rule (HIPAA),18 and
the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA)19are
already in place? Aside from legal concerns,20 there are both
historical21 and ethical22 concerns with collecting genetic in-
formation that are not addressed by existing laws.
subpart B, additional protections for pregnant women, human fetuses, and
neonates; subpart C, additional protections for prisoners; and subpart D, addi-
tional protections for children. Each agency includes . . . section numbers and
language that are identical to those of the HHS codification . . . . For all partic-
ipating departments and agencies the Common Rule outlines the basic provi-
sions for IRBs, informed consent, and Assurances of Compliance. Human sub-
ject research conducted or supported by each federal department/agency is
governed by the regulations of that department/agency. The head of that de-
partment/agency retains final judgment as to whether a particular activity it
conducts or supports is covered by the Common Rule.).
18. The Privacy Rule, U.S. DEPT HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/privacyrule/ (last visited
Oct. 14, 2015) (The HIPAA Privacy Rule establishes national standards to
protect individuals medical records and other personal health information
and applies to health plans, health care clearinghouses, and those health care
providers that conduct certain health care transactions electronically. The
Rule requires appropriate safeguards to protect the privacy of personal health
information, and sets limits and conditions on the uses and disclosures that
may be made of such information without patient authorization. The Rule also
gives patients rights over their health information, including rights to exam-
ine and obtain a copy of their health records, and to request corrections. The
Privacy Rule is located at 45 CFR Part 160 and Subparts A and E of Part
164.).
19. Genetic Information Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/genetic.cfm (last visited Oct. 14,
2015) (Title II of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (GI-
NA) . . . took effect on November 21, 2009. Under Title II of GINA, it is illegal
to discriminate against employees or applicants because of genetic infor-
mation. Title II of GINA prohibits the use of genetic information in making
employment decisions, restricts employers and other entities covered by Title
II (employment agencies, labor organizations and joint labor-management
training and apprenticeship programs - referred to as covered entities) from
requesting, requiring or purchasing genetic information, and strictly limits the
disclosure of genetic information. The EEOC enforces Title II of GINA . . . .
The Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services and the Treasury
have responsibility for issuing regulations for Title I of GINA, which addresses
the use of genetic information in health insurance.).
20. See ADITI SHAH, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE GENETICS, DO YOU
KNOW WHERE YOUR DNA IS? GENETIC PRIVACY AND NON-FORENSIC BI-
OBANKS 79, 1317, 2226 (2014), http://www.councilforresponsiblegen
etics.org/pageDocuments/L0Z6I8MLM3.pdf (discussing privacy implications
from storing DNA information in newborn biobanks, voluntary research data-
bases, and commercial databases).
21. See infra notes 2380 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 81109 and accompanying text.
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B. HISTORICAL CONCERNS STEMMING FROM THE EUGENICS
MOVEMENT
Current ethical, legal, and policy developments concerning
human genetics cannot be understood without reference to the
unique historical underpinnings stemming from the eugenics
movement.23 Even still, some advocates analogize the current
revolution in molecular biology . . . to modify the pattern of
human heredity for the better to [t]he eugenics movement of
1870-1950.24 Regardless of historical uniqueness or continuity,
there is growing popular interest in issues surrounding genetic
privacy, as seen in the popularity of the recent book The Im-
mortal Life of Henrietta Lacks,25 which was named a Notable
Book of the Year by the New York Times.26 The book follows a
tumor tissue sample taken from Ms. Lacks without her con-
sent; her cells in this sample could divide indefinitely, ultimate-
ly leading to their use in hundreds of scientific experiments in
the following decades.27 The books popularity highlights an
ever-increasing public concern about the implications of immor-
tality through the either consensual or nonconsensual disper-
sion of ones genetic material, in spite of the benefits such dis-
persion can offer.
Though the origin of eugenics can find some foundation in
Charles Darwins The Origin of Species (some authors would
note that historical traces can be found as far back as the
23. See LORI B. ANDREWS, MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN & MARK A. ROTHSTEIN,
GENETICS: ETHICS, LAW AND POLICY 4792 (3d ed. 2010).
24. ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND
JUSTICE 2728 (2000).
25. REBECCA SKLOOT, THE IMMORTAL LIFE OF HENRIETTA LACKS (2010).
26. 100 Notable Books of 2010, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/05/books/review/100-notable-books-
2010.html.
27. SKLOOT, supra note 25, at 4 (Scientists had been trying to keep hu-
man cells alive in culture for decades, but the all eventually died. Henriettas
were different: they reproduced an entire generation every twenty-four hours,
and they never stopped . . . . If we went to almost any cell culture lab in the
world and opened its freezers . . . wed probably find millionsif not billions
of Henriettas cells in small vials on ice. Her cells were part of research into
the genes that cause cancer and those that suppress it; they helped develop
drugs for treating herpes, leukemia, influenza, hemophilia, and Parkinsons
disease . . . . Their chromosomes and proteins have been studied with such
detail and precision that scientists know their every quirk.).
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Greek city states28), the true pioneer of modern eugenic theory
was Francis Galton with his work in Inquiries into Human
Faculty and its Development.29 Galtons work influenced two
Americans: Charles Davenport, a member of the National
Academy of Sciences, and Harry Hamilton Laughlin, an activ-
ist who used the research of Davenport to strategize the Ameri-
can eugenics movement.30 Both men advocated for tying re-
search on human genetics, specifically the newly rediscovered
work of Gregory Mendel on genetic inheritance, to eugenics in
order to provide the eugenics movement with the requisite sci-
entific legitimacy necessary to promulgate scientific policy.31 As
a result of their activism, [l]ocal eugenics societies and groups
sprang up around the United States after World War I, with
names such as the Race Betterment Foundation.32 Not only
did eugenicists promote better breeding, they wanted to prevent
poor breeding or the risk of it. That meant keeping people with
undesirable traits in their heritage (including alcoholism, pau-
perism, or epilepsy) separate from others or, where law al-
lowed, preventing them from reproducing.33 Laws mandating
vasectomy were first advocated for,34 followed by laws mandat-
ing sterilization.35 After World War I, the movement began to
flourish; by 1926, seventeen states had eugenic sterilization
laws.36
28. David J. Galton, Greek Theories on Eugenics, 24 J. MED. ETHICS 263
67 (1998) (Platos works do reveal a profound interest in eugenics as a means
of supplying the city state with the finest possible progeny.).
29. Philip R. Reilly, Eugenics, Ethics, Sterilization Laws, in 1 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 204, 205
(Thomas H. Murray & Maxwell J. Mehlman eds., 2000) (Galton . . . began
investigating the inheritance of talent among eminent English families about
1864. He coined the term eugenics . . . in 1883 in Inquiries into Human Facul-
ty and its Development. Public interest in the notion that the success and fail-
ure in life might be closely tied to the germ plasm that one inherited grew
rapidly . . . . In 1904 . . . Galton drafted an official definition of natural eugen-
ics as the study of the agencies under social control that may improve or im-




32. Eugenics Movement Reaches Its Height, PBS ONLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aso/databank/entries/dh23eu.html (last visited Oct.
14, 2015).
33. Id.
34. Reilly, supra note 29, at 206.
35. Id. at 20607.
36. Id. at 20708.
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Buck v. Bell37 marked the major affirmation of these laws.
A forced sterilization law in the State of Virginia provided that:
the health of the patient and the welfare of society may be promoted
in certain cases by the sterilization of mental defectives, under care-
ful safeguard . . . who if now discharged would become a menace but
if incapable of procreating might be discharged with safety and be-
come self-supporting with benefit to themselves and to society.38
Carrie Buck, the plaintiff, was found feeble minded by the
State of Virginia by nature of her birth and based on an alleged
record during life of immorality, prostitution, and untruthful-
ness; had never been self-sustaining; and has had one illegiti-
mate child . . . supposed to be mental defective.39 The evidence
at trial was based on findings that [h]er mother, Emma Buck,
was maritally unworthy; having been divorced from her hus-
band on account of infidelity . . . and has had one illegitimate
child and probably two others inclusive of Carrie Buck;40 tes-
timony of eight witnesses near the area surrounding Carrie
Bucks home; and two Virginia physicians.41 The counsel for the
superintendent of the state institution attempted through this
mix of expert opinion and character evidence to show social
inadequacy and subsequently uphold Bucks forced steriliza-
tion under the Virginia sterilization law.42 The counsel for Car-
rie Buckwho was a former director of the state institution
seeking sterilizationcalled no witnesses, and records not pre-
sented at trial showed that almost all of the allegations con-
cerning Carrie Bucks character or morals were actually un-
true.43 Rather, she, like many unwed mothers of that time, was
institutionalized in the first place to prevent further shame to
the family.44 The Supreme Court, however, came to the conclu-
sion that [t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough and af-
37. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
38. Id. at 20506.
39. Paul A. Lombardo, Three Generations, No Imbeciles: New Light on
Buck v. Bell, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 51 (1985) (quoting Albert Priddy from a
deposition in the trial record available to the Supreme Court).
40. Id. (quoting Albert Priddy from a deposition in the trial record availa-
ble to the Supreme Court).
41. Id. at 50.
42. Id. at 5053.
43. Id. at 5054.
44. Id. at 54 (noting that Carrie Buck was originally committed because
she became pregnant after her foster parents nephew had raped her); Paul
Lombardo, Eugenic Sterilization Laws, COLD SPRING HARBOR LABORATORY,
http://www.eugenicsarchive.org/html/eugenics/essay8text.html (last visited
Oct. 14, 2015).
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firmed the mandatory sterilization of Carrie Buck on the
grounds of public good.45
The legality of these laws resulted in widespread public
comfort regarding morally ambiguous laws.46 Legality of the
statutes concerning eugenics failed to change until nearly fif-
teen years later with Skinner v. Oklahoma.47 In Skinner, the
Supreme Court finally overruled an Oklahoma statute allowing
for habitual criminals to be rendered sexually sterile if done
without detriment to his or her general health.48 The Court,
pursuant to public policy, found that [m]arriage and procrea-
tion are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race49 and stated that procreation involves one of the basic
civil rights of man.50 As a result, the Supreme Court held that
the depriv[ation] of a basic liberty cannot be justified, and
subsequently had to strike down the state law on Fourteenth
Amendment grounds.51
1. Racial and Prejudicial Exploitation
Though the Personalized Medicine Initiative is not seeking
to directly control populations like the eugenics movement, the
historical underpinnings inherent in population-based research
are important for a variety of reasons. First, when discussing
the government policies concerned with genetics and health,
the historical context of exploitation of one population at the
whim of another is important.52 Historical recognition that
45. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
46. See ANDREWS, MEHLMAN & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 23, at 64 (discuss-
ing, for example, how from 1917 to 1983, the state of Oregon forced more than
2,500 Oregonians to be sterilized).
47. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
48. Id. at 537.
49. Id. at 541.
50. Id.
51. Id. (When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have commit-
ted intrinsically the same quality of offense and sterilizes one and not the oth-
er, it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular
race or nationality for oppressive treatment.).
52. See generally Michael Yudell, A Short History of the Race Concept, in
RACE AND THE GENETIC REVOLUTION: SCIENCE, MYTH, AND CULTURE 13, 21
(Sheldon Krimsky & Kathleen Sloan eds., 2011) (Yet, despite the best inten-
tions by scientists . . . to reconceptualize the concept of race for modern biolo-
gy, evidence suggests that these geneticists and their scientific allies ultimate-
ly helped to preserve the concept of race in science, and hence for use by both
scientific and nonscientific racistsits methodological utility to evolutionary
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some subpopulations have been forced to comply with statutes
that may be buttressed with weak scientific correlations is
essential to understand the privacy considerations central in
modern scientific policy.53 The Initiative, as such, should con-
tinue its current regimen of substantial disclosure concerning
the justifying science before moving to drastic goals or polices.54
In conjunction, legally tolerated selective breeding result-
ing from private (rather than public) decision-making continues
to flourish in the United States.55 Currently, the only federal
law concerning in vitro fertilization (IVF) services is the Fertili-
ty Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992,56 which
merely requires infertility clinics to report success rates in a
standardized fashion; further, state regulations of these clinics
are minimal.57 The rise of correlations stemming from these
data on health populations from the Personalized Medicine Ini-
tiative could further advance the aforementioned stigmas and,
in particular, drive racial bias.58 In conjunction, private family
planning initiatives,59 reversible contraceptive services and
biologists and population geneticists would quickly be exploited and manipu-
lated by these racists.).
53. See generally id.
54. DIXIE BAKER ET AL., NATL INST. HEALTH, PARTICIPANT ENGAGEMENT,
DATA PRIVACY, AND NOVEL WAYS OF RETURNING INFORMATION TO PARTICI-
PANTS 5 (2015), [https://web.archive.org/web
/20151005053135/http://www.nih.gov/precisionmedicine/whitepapers/
Participant-Engagement-Data-Privacy-Returning-Information.pdf] (stating
that a goal of the Initiative is to Develop novel ways to communicate, inform,
and educate the public about research and health issues broadly, which will
build capacity for an engaged and informed public. Increased public comfort
with the science underlying precision medicine will be important to prepare
individuals to be partners in health care decisions down the road.).
55. Maxwell J. Mehlman, Modern Eugenics and the Law, in A CENTURY
OF EUGENICS IN AMERICA: FROM THE INDIANA EXPERIMENT TO THE HUMAN
GENOME ERA 219, 22223 (Paul A. Lombardo ed., 2011) (Some of the most
glaring selective breeding practices are associated with gamete donation . . . .
A company called Fertility Alternatives pays a premium to exceptional egg
donors. To qualify, the donor must have graduated from a major university, or
be currently attending one, preferably Ivy League; have a GPA of 3.0+; SAT
scores of 1350+ or ACT scores of 30+; and have a documented high IQ.).
56. Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-493, 106 Stat. 3146 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to a-7 (2012)).
57. MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN, THE PRICE OF PERFECTION: INDIVIDUALISM
AND SOCIETY IN THE ERA OF BIOMEDICAL ENHANCEMENT 149 (2009) (There is
little state regulation of IVF clinics).
58. See generally Yudell, supra note 52.
59. Mehlman, supra note 55, at 224 (describing one private family plan-
ning initiative in California called Project Prevention (formerly CRACK)
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sterilization services aimed at the poor,60 or federal child tax
credits61 could all be termed neo-eugenic practices.62 Thus,
the government needs to ensure that information disclosures
stemming from this Initiative control for racial or other preju-
dicial biases and narrowly tailor their outcomes to avoid ineq-
uitable treatment, noting that modern big data considerations
and computer-generated algorithms can mask prejudices while
maintaining a patina of scientific objectivity.63 Currently, the
methods of the Initiative, at least those to identify and recruit
cohorts, only list this concern, while failing to list a recommen-
dation on how to reconcile it.64
2. The Volume, Variety, and Velocity of Data Being Uploaded
The second major consideration necessary to incorporate
relative to the eugenics movement is the governments embrace
of collecting large amounts of data on a population and then
linking and aggregating other information sources to generate
complex dossiers on individuals.65 Professor Gostin from
Georgetown University Law Center conceptualizes the problem
as follows:
that was started in 1997 and gave drug addicts $200 if they undergo steriliza-
tion or use long-term birth control; in 2003, the organization claimed 23
chapters nationwide and had paid 907 women, of which African Americans
and Hispanics accounted for 401 of the participants).
60. Id. at 227 ([T]he government in 2001 spent $1.26 billion on reversible
contraceptive services and $95 million on sterilization services. These funds
are distributed through several programs . . . . [V]irtually all of these funds
are earmarked for the poor. (footnote omitted)).
61. Id. at 228!29 ([T]he more children the taxpaying family has, the
larger the number of credits that it can claim. The policy might be regarded as
eugenic in that, since only families with enough income to pay taxes benefit
from the credit, the policy creates an incentive for better-off families to have
more children.).
62. See id. at 22433 (labeling as neo-eugenic a number of public and pri-
vate efforts to encourage or discourage procreation among targeted groups
based on perceived benefits to society).
63. EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES,
PRESERVING VALUES 46 (2014) [hereinafter BIG DATA],
[https://web.archive.org/web/20140501190752/http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites
/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf].
64. REBECCA BAKER ET. AL., NATL INST. HEALTH, BUILDING A CONSORTI-
UM OF COHORTS  COHORT IDENTIFICATION AND PARTICIPANT RECRUITMENT 4
(2015), https://www.nih.gov/sites/default/files/research-training/initiatives
/pmi/building-consortium-cohorts.pdf.
65. See, e.g., BIG DATA, supra note 63.
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The combination of emerging computer and genetic technologies pos-
es particularly compelling privacy concerns. While this technology
can markedly facilitate research, screening, and treatment of genetic
conditions, it may also permit a significant reduction in privacy
through its capacity to store and decipher unimaginable quantities of
highly sensitive data. A variety of underlying harms to patients may
result from unwanted disclosures of these sensitive genomic data.66
Linking various forms of data with an array of factors (includ-
ing genetics) may present false correlations and may result in
an increase in researchers asserting mistaken outcomes, arbi-
trary choices, or underestimate the high degree of uncertainty
in the judgment it produces.67 Because it is the government
that collects this personal information about an individual, the-
se data are subject to a variety of regulations68 and constitu-
tional protections. Yet, these once strong regulations have been
eroded through recent Supreme Court cases regarding DNA
repositories.69
Specifically, the magnitude of data being produced and col-
lected is resulting in the initially-made protections being by-
passed; in 2013, the world had surpassed an estimated four
zettabytes of total stored data, while the one zettabyte marker
had only been passed in 2010.70 The benefits of collecting mass
amounts of data may be a good thing, but will depend on how
data are interpreted and used.71 This said, with increasing vol-
66. Lawrence O. Gostin, Genetic Privacy, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 320, 324
(1995).
67. BIG DATA, supra note 63, at 4547.
68. See supra notes 1719 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 113170 and accompanying text.
70. John Gantz & David Reinsel, Extracting Value from Chaos, IDC (June
2011), http://www.emc.com/collateral/analyst-reports/idc-extracting-value-
from-chaos-ar.pdf; BIG DATA, supra note 63, at 2 (A zettabyte is
1,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 bytes, or units of information. Consider that a
single byte equals one character of text . . . . [I]magine that every person in the
United States took a digital photo every second of every day for over a month.
All of those photos put together would equal about one zettabyte. More than
500 million photos are uploaded and shared every day . . . 200 hours of video
are uploaded every minute.).
71. BIG DATA, supra note 63, at 7 (For example, a genetic researcher at
the Broad Institute found that having a large number of genetic datasets
makes the critical difference in identifying the meaningful genetic variant for
a disease. In this research, a genetic variant related to schizophrenia was not
detectable when analyzed in 3,500 cases, and was only weakly identifiable
using 10,000 cases, but was suddenly statistically significant with 35,000 cas-
es. As the researcher observed, There is an inflection point at which every-
thing changes. The need for vast quantities of dataparticularly personally
sensitive data like genetic datais a significant challenge for researchers for a
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ume, variety, and velocity of data collected by the government
about individual subjects, the opportunity and possibilities of
correlation to certain prejudices or traits increasingly become a
reality.72
That genetic information would be used to discriminate or
oppress is not just a hypothetical issue. In response to in-
creased concerns over genetic discrimination, Congress passed
the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA), which
protects against genetic information being used for any aspect
of an employment decision,73 in prohibiting health insurance
coverage in the individual market, or to establish rules for the
eligibility (including continued eligibility) for any individual
enrolling in an individual health insurance plan.74 However,
GINA does not regulate other forms of insurance and does not
protect a party after they develop a condition (sometimes
termed phenotypic penetration) in either the health insur-
ance or employment discrimination context.75 Further, with big
variety of reasons, but notably because of privacy laws that limit access to
data. The data clusters and relationships revealed in large data sets can be
unexpected but deliver incisive results. On the other hand, even with lots of
data, the information revealed by big data analysis isnt necessarily perfect.
Identifying a pattern doesnt establish whether that pattern is significant.
Correlation still doesnt equal causation. Finding a correlation with big data
techniques may not be an appropriate basis for predicting outcomes or behav-
ior, or rendering judgments on individuals. In big data, as with all data, inter-
pretation is always important.).
72. Cf. id.
73. Genetic Information Discrimination, supra note 19 (The law forbids
discrimination on the basis of genetic information when it comes to any aspect
of employment, including hiring, firing, pay, job assignments, promotions,
layoffs, training, fringe benefits, or any other term or condition of employ-
ment. An employer may never use genetic information to make an employment
decision because genetic information is not relevant to an individuals current
ability to work.).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(a)(6).
75. Russell Korobkin & Rahul Rajkumar, The Genetic Information Non-
discrimination Act  A Half-Step Toward Risk Sharing, 359 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 335, 336 (2008) (First, GINA not only fails to protect the person with
colonic polyps; it actually leaves him worse off . . . . Because insurance compa-
nies may no longer make use of clearly relevant information such as family
history in their risk assessment, they will rely even more heavily on current
health status when setting rates, even when it has only slight value in predict-
ing future illness . . . . Second, . . . those whose genes put them at lower risk
can opt out entirely or, more likely, purchase insurance with higher deducti-
bles, greater cost sharing, and more exclusions.); Mark A. Rothstein, GINAs
Beauty Is Only Skin Deep, GENEWATCH, Apr.May 2009, at 9, 910,
http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org
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data transmitting increasing amounts of personal infor-
mation,76 it is increasingly possible that this genetic infor-
mation could be somehow disclosed and, as a result, employers
that have obtained genetic information could search for other
justifiable factors to use to justify an adverse action.77 Further,
from a public health perspective, disclosure of any sensitive
health information may result in the inability to obtain insur-
ance or employment78 which subsequently may raise an indi-
viduals medical debt (leading to further public health issues)79
or keep regional unemployment rates high. Privacy concerns
regarding DNA information have been increasing in recent
/genewatch/GeneWatchPage.aspx?pageId=184 (There are three major flaws
with GINA. First, it applies only to two aspects of the problem, discrimination
in health insurance and employment . . . . GINA does nothing to prohibit dis-
crimination in life insurance, disability insurance, long-term care insurance,
mortgages, commercial transactions, or any of the other possible uses of genet-
ic information . . . . Second, GINAs prohibition on genetic discrimination in
health insurance is largely a mirage . . . . HIPAA prohibits discrimination by
group health plans on the basis of any health information . . . . Third, the em-
ployment provisions of GINA are ineffective, but for different reasons. As with
health insurance, the employment provisions only apply to individuals who
are asymptomatic . . . . GINA . . . qualifies this by saying that employers can
require the release of all medical information except genetic information . . . .
Because this information is commonly interspersed in medical records there is
no practical way for the custodians of the health records (e.g., physicians, hos-
pitals) to send only non-genetic information.).
76. See BIG DATA, supra note 63, at 2.
77. The combination of big data and leaked genetic information could al-
low for genetic discrimination to occur, as it did in a pre-GINA case where the
court granted no relief to a plaintiff who alleged she was pushed into less de-
sirable, lower-pay position after her employer learned of a genetic disorder.
Laws v. Pact, Inc., No. 98C8107, 2000 WL 777926, at *34 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19,
2000) (holding that a plaintiff must establish that her disability impacted on
the defendants decisions after a plaintiff provided evidence that the defend-
ant began to scheme to terminate her after finding out she had a high genetic
predisposition for Huntingtons Disease; the employer, via spontaneously of-
fering her a similar position instead, was, in the courts words offering a rea-
sonable accommodation).
78. See Mark A. Rothstein & Meghan K. Talbott, Compelled Disclosure of
Health Information: Protecting Against the Greatest Potential Threat to Priva-
cy, 295 J. AM. MED. ASSN 2882, 288283 (2006) (discussing the relative inabil-
ity of health record custodians to prevent disclosure of sensitive genetic infor-
mation).
79. KAREN POLLITZ ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICAL
DEBT AMONG PEOPLE WITH HEALTH INSURANCE 1519 (2014),
https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/8537-medical-debt-
among-people-with-health-insurance.pdf (presenting case studies on the con-
sequences of medical debt, which range from emotional distress to bankruptcy
and homelessness).
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times with the exploitation of gaps in these laws becoming
more apparent.80
C. MODERN BIOETHICAL CONCERNS
The Initiative seeks to combine data from more than 200
large American health studies that are ongoing and together
involve at least two million people.81 Three major bioethical
issues are implicated by this proposed database study: main-
taining meaningful contact with participants to allow with-
drawal of consent and report incidental findings; storing sam-
ples and data with adequate informed consent for later uses;
and ensuring data remains secure.82
First, maintaining contact with participants as to allow an
ease of consent withdrawal may somewhat resolve problems of
incidental findings in this Initiative. If the government con-
glomerates information from multiple studies or utilizes infor-
mation beyond the scope of the original studies, the govern-
ment may be bypassing what was initially consented to when
participants agreed to enroll in the original study.83 In the con-
text of the Precision Medicine Initiative, how the government
presents consent issues to participants and asks for consent
given the number of potential uses and potential users of the
databaseis the main first issue. The government attempted
to alleviate consent concerns through the Common Rule.84
Under the standards and norms of the Common Rule, research
subjects must be allowed to discontinue their participation at
any time without penalty or loss of benefits to which they
80. See generally SHAH, supra note 20.
81. Regalado, supra note 9.
82. For a general critical discussion of sample biobanks in Canada, and
Europe that obtain broad consent from participants to cover unforeseen future
uses of data rather than dynamic consent, which involves iterative follow-up
when later uses become known, see generally Kristin Solum Steinsbekk,
Bjørn Kåre Myskja & Berge Solberg, Broad Consent Versus Dynamic Consent
in Biobank Research: Is Passive Participation an Ethical Problem?, 21 EUR. J.
HUMAN GENETICS 897 (2013).
83. For a general discussion of how informed consent rules and norms are
derived from a different type of research than is relevant for biobanks, and
how there is a need for different rules to address different bioethical issues,
see generally Mark A. Rothstein, Expanding the Ethical Analysis of Biobanks,
33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 89 (2005).
84. See generally supra note 17 for background on the Common Rule.
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would otherwise be entitled.85 However, in the context of a ge-
netic database, applying the Common Rule is complicated by
the fact that samples and data from a participant may already
be distributed to secondary research users who did not collect
the specimen from the participant.86 This concern is not just
limited to uses by additional government researchers, private
entities (or those entities exempt from these Federal regula-
tions) may end up using the database or derivative research
products, and these entities do not need to necessarily comply
with the Common Rule.87 As a result, any future disclosures
of the Initiatives datasets to the public or to private, third par-
ty researchers not bound by the Common Rule could result in
publically-disclosed personal information that is not available
for this opting out. Similarly, deletion or removal of this infor-
mation may be an issue if the program ever becomes discontin-
ued, or if users opt-outpresuming they are even allowed to in
the first place. Options after closure include destroying the
specimens, transferring them to another facility, or letting
them sit unused in freezers.88 These raise a multitude of ques-
tions about what to do with specimens and when level of con-
sent should be implicated.89
85. Amy L. McGuire & Laura M. Beskow, Informed Consent in Genomics
and Genetic Research, 11 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUMAN GENETICS 361, 369
(2010).
86. See id.
87. See ERIN WILLIAMS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31340, FEDERAL PRO-
TECTION FOR HUMAN RESEARCH SUBJECTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE COMMON
RULE AND ITS INTERACTIONS WITH FDA REGULATIONS AND THE HIPAA PRI-
VACY RULE 6, 1011, 1819 (2005), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32909.pdf
(noting the Common Rule applies to the eighteen departments and agencies
doing and funding research, but has not been adopted by all agencies that
fund research and would not necessarily apply to research conducted with-
out federal money or private companies).
88. See R. Jean Cadigan et al., Neglected Ethical Issues in Biobank Man-
agement: Results from a U.S. Study, LIFE SCI. SOCY & POLY, Mar. 2013, at 1,
58 (reporting from a study of 456 U.S. biobanks that many often lack ade-
quate planning for closure, and many samples are retained with hypothetical
uses never becoming relevant).
89. See, e.g., id. at 9 ([H]eightened expectations surrounding biobanks
and other biotechnologies may cause people to set their hopes too high, while
ignoring significant barriers, for what these technologies can offer future re-
search . . . . [T]he discrepancy between biobankers optimism for results
and . . . planning for termination, and specimen utilization, may inadvertently
undermine transparency, informed consent, and ultimately, public trust. (ci-
tations omitted)).
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In line with bioethical issues around withdrawal of consent
and termination of sample storage, major concerns exist for re-
porting incidental findings and individual research results that
have potential health, reproductive, or personal importance to
participants.90 No consensus yet exists on how to handle inci-
dental findings in human subjects research,91 though some re-
searchers have concluded that researchers have an [ethical]
obligation to address the possibility of discovering IFs [inci-
dental findings] not only in their protocol and communications
with the IRB [Institutional Review Board], but also in their
consent forms and communications with . . . research partici-
pants.92 These research efforts have yet to translate into ex-
plicitly stated legal duties.93
Second, storing samples and data with adequate informed
consent for later uses is an issue. Both collection and retention
of this data is problematic; with this proposed Initiative, how
the government ensures data collected remains secure both
when in the hands of the government and researchers remains
a serious issue. Questions on when, where, and how long this
information is being held creates a vast array of bioethical and
privacy concerns.94 Research on samples of human biological
90. See Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings and Research
Results in Genomic Research Involving Biobanks and Archived Data Sets, 14
GENETICS MED. 361, 36570 (2012) (discussing unresolved issues and core
bioethical questions for biobanks dealing with individual research results from
research studies and incidental findings indicated or implied from research).
91. See id.; PRESIDENTIAL COMMN FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES,
ANTICIPATE AND COMMUNICATE: ETHICAL MANAGEMENT OF INCIDENTAL AND
SECONDARY FINDINGS IN THE CLINICAL, RESEARCH, AND DIRECT-TO-
CONSUMER CONTEXTS 2324, 8292 (2013) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL COM-
MISSION],
http://bioethics.gov/sites/default/files/FINALAnticipateCommunicate_PCSBI_0
.pdf; Danielle Ofri, Medicines Problem of Incidental Findings, ATLANTIC
(Dec. 12, 2013, 2:00 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health
/archive/2013/12/medicines-problem-of-incidental-findings/282294/.
92. Susan M. Wolf et al., Managing Incidental Findings in Human Sub-
jects Research, 36 J.L. MED. ETHICS 219, 227 (2008); see PRESIDENTIAL COM-
MISSION, supra note 91; Ofri, supra note 91.
93. See Tilousi v. Ariz. State Univ. Bd. of Regents, No. 04-CV-1290, 2005
WL 6199562, at *26 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2005) (dismissing claims for various
tort damages by members of the Havasupai Indian Tribe whose blood samples
had been provided to study diabetes rates, but were collected and stored under
broad consent waivers and used for a variety of non-diabetes genetic research
studies at Arizona State University).
94. See generally R. Jean Cadigan et al., Thats a Good Question: Uni-
versity Researchers Views on Ownership and Retention of Human Genetic
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materials often occurs in two stages: initial collection and stor-
age of samples and later research use and analysis of those
samples.95 This gap between collection and analysis can pose a
problem for informed consent as research needs and hypotheses
evolve over time and may diverge from uses known and con-
sented to at collectionthis issue is especially pronounced for
biobanks where longer storage periods are often involved.96 It
has been suggested that to meet the ethical norms of informed
consent when creating a biobank, participants should be given
comprehensive information about the repository (i.e., the collec-
tion of stored materials) itself, including details concerning its
purpose, procedures, confidentiality protections, risks, and
benefits.97 Even when providing detailed information on antic-
ipated research uses, biobanks often present a more complex
issue, as future research or research proposals may not be
available at the time of initial participant consent.98 To fully
meet ethical norms, it has been proposed that researchers
should re-contact participants to obtain specific consent for
each additional use, but these follow-up consent contacts yield
their own bioethical considerations, as participants may find
repeated contact to obtain consent for each study using their
specimen may be seen as an unwelcome intrusion and a disin-
centive to participation.99 A derivative concern when conduct-
ing repeated consent contacts may occur as participants may
make assumptions about why they were included in a second-
ary study, and may come to erroneous conclusions about why
their specimens have been selected for the study of a particular
gene or condition.100 Any regime requiring re-contact and ex-
Specimens, 13 GENETICS MED. 569 (2011) (indicating that researchers often
have misperceptions over who owns stored research samples and how owner-
ship affects any associated stewardship obligations).
95. See McGuire & Beskow, supra note 85, at 362 (identifying the typical
two stage research process as an opportunity for bioethical issues).
96. See, e.g., Steinsbekk, Myskja & Solberg, supra note 82.
97. McGuire & Beskow, supra note 85, at 363.
98. See id.
99. Id.; accord Rothstein, supra note 83, at 93 ([T]he repeated recontact-
ing of individual sample donors to solicit additional authorizations is likely to
represent a greater intrusion on their privacy.).
100. McGuire & Beskow, supra note 85, at 363 (citing Laura M. Beskow &
Elizabeth Dean, Informed Consent for Biorepositories: Assessing Prospective
Participants Understanding and Opinions, 17 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY BI-
OMARKERS PREVENTION 1440 (2008); Susanne B. Haga & Laura M. Beskow,
Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of Biobanks for Genetics Research, 60
ADVANCES GENETICS 505 (2008)).
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plicit consent for each additional research use may result in
increased costs, administrative burdens, and delays, and would
likely diminish the value of the database and cause partici-
pants to drop-out which would have an adverse effect on valid-
ity due to non-response and loss to follow-up.101 Again, how to
deal with these concerns is hotly debated.102
Finally, ensuring the security of this information is im-
portant as data breaches would violate participant consent and
would lead to significant privacy and even personal ramifica-
tions. HIPAA should require protection of personally identifia-
ble health information from a biobank, such that additional
authorizations are required for later use or disclosure.103 How-
ever, it is unclear when and how some of these established reg-
ulations are triggered in the case where information is thought
to be disconnected or not individually identifiable, but is later
found to be identifiable because information allowing re-
connection of data has been incidentally released, or made
available through an illegal data breach.104 Some authors argue
that genetic data cannot really be de-identified, and infor-
mation stolen in a data breach could likely be re-identified us-
ing even basic metadata information and identity tracing tech-
niques.105 Although causes of action have developed in tort to
allow protection of privacy,106 and federal administrative agen-
101. Id.
102. See, e.g., Mats G. Hansson et al., Should Donors Be Allowed to Give
Broad Consent to Future Biobank Research?, 7 LANCET ONCOLOGY 266 (2006);
Darren Shickle, The Consent Problem Within DNA Biobanks, 37 STUD. HIST.
PHIL. BIOLOGICAL & BIOMEDICAL SCI. 503 (2006); Steinsbekk, Myskja & Sol-
berg, supra note 82.
103. See Rothstein, supra note 83, at 9394 (discussing the more strict
requirements of HIPPA on biobanks than the requirements of the Common
Rule).
104. See Rothstein, supra note 83, at 98 (noting that even a HIPAA non-
covered entity, like a private sector biobank, must comply with the require-
ments of HIPAA because its data or specimens may have come from a cov-
ered entity).
105. Yaniv Erlich & Arvind Narayanan, Routes for Breaching and Protect-
ing Genetic Privacy, 15 NATURE REV. GENETICS 409 (2014) (outlining a num-
ber of data breaching and data mining techniques that are used to conduct
identity tracing attacks with basic demographic information and genetic in-
formation).
106. E.g., Tilousi v. Ariz. State Univ. Bd. of Regents, No. 04-CV-1290, 2005
WL 6199562, at *26 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2005) (filing claims for breach of fidu-
ciary duty and lack of informed consent, fraud and misrepresenta-
tion/fraudulent concealment, negligent infliction of emotional distress,
conversion, negligence, and unreasonabl[e] disclsur[e] [of] private facts
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cies enforce statutes that attempt to ensure privacy and securi-
ty of personal information,107 the rapid expansion of big da-
ta108 directly correlates to an increase in the potential for data
breaches.109 While de-identifying data to remove potential bias
by researchers is feasible, the ability of even the federal gov-
ernment to keep de-identified information from being re-
connected to individuals is questionable in light of high profile
data breacheslike the breach reported in 2015 of the Office of
Personal Managements databases of personnel and back-
ground check information on federal government employees,
contractors, and other parties.110
on behalf of members of the Havasupai Indian Tribe whose blood samples had
been provided to researchers at Arizona State University to study diabetes
rates, but were collected and stored under broad consent waivers and used for
a variety of non-diabetes genetic research studies); see William L. Prosser,
Privacy, 48 CALF. L. REV. 383, 38689 (1960) (noting the progression of state
courts recognizing a right to privacy and a claim for damages from invasion of
privacy).
107. See, e.g., Dave & Busters Inc., 149 F.T.C. 1449, 2010 WL 9434816, at
*1 (2010) (issuing an order under the Federal Trade Commission Act to force a
restaurant chain to develop a network security system capable of preventing
third party data breaches of credit card information); see also Data Security,
FED. TRADE COMMN, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/privacy-
and-security/data-security (last visited Oct. 15, 2015) (providing resources to
businesses on their legal obligation to keep customer and employee personal
information safe from data breaches). But see In re iPhone Application Litig.,
844 F. Supp. 2d 1040 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (holding that mobile devices did not
constitute facilities through which electronic communication service was pro-
vided under the Stored Communications Act (SCA), location data was not in
electronic storage for purposes of the SCA, users geolocation data did not
constitute content susceptible to interception under the Wiretap Act,
and alleged disclosure of users unique device identifier number, personal da-
ta, and geolocation information did not violate users right to privacy); In re
Jetblue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)
(holding that airlines transfer of personal information of its passengers to the
federal government following Sept. 11, 2001 was not a violation of the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA)).
108. See supra notes 6569 and accompanying text.
109. EXPERIAN, DATA BREACH INDUSTRY FORECAST 5 (2015),
http://www.experian.com/assets/data-breach/white-papers/2015-industry-
forecast-experian.pdf (including among the Top 6 Data Breach Trends for
2015 that data breaches of healthcare data storage and digitized medical
records will increase).
110. U.S. OFFICE PERS. MGMT., Cybersecurity Resource Center: Cybersecu-
rity Incidents, https://www.opm.gov/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-incidents/
(last visited Dec. 7, 2015) (In June 2015, OPM discovered that the back-
ground investigation records of current, former, and prospective Federal em-
ployees and contractors had been stolen. OPM . . . [has] concluded with high
confidence that sensitive information . . . of 21.5 million individuals, was sto-
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II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The transition to a world of Big Data is forcing our concep-
tions of privacy to evolve, but there is still significant room to
respect individual expectations of privacy,111 and there is no
reason to believe that individuals will accept invasions to pri-
vacy just because the novel methods of using data inherent in
a computerized information system (like the Initiative) also
allow novel methods of invading privacy.112
A. REPORTING SYSTEMS IN DNA RESEARCH (CIVIL CONCERNS)
In Whalen v. Roe, a New York law created a database of
individuals receiving prescriptions for Schedule II drugs, in-
cluding the names of the prescribing physicians.113 The law op-
erated by requiring physicians to report the name of the pre-
scribing physician; the dispensing pharmacy; the drug and dos-
dosage; and the name, address, and age of the patient.114 This
information was then stored by the New York Department of
Health in a heavily guarded location, and was retained for a
period of five years.115 Public disclosure of the information was
strictly prohibited and to prevent any disclosure, the state in-
stalled several safeguards to secure the data.116 At the district
court level, the statutes were found to be an unconstitutional
interference with a right to privacy under the fourteenth and
len . . . . Earlier in 2015, OPM discovered that the personnel data of 4.2 mil-
lion current and former Federal government employees had been stolen.).
111. See generally BIG DATA, supra note 63.
112. Vincent M. Brannigan, Protecting the Privacy of Patient Information
in Clinical Networks: Regulatory Effectiveness Analysis, 670 ANNALS N.Y.
ACAD. SCI. 190, 190 (1992).
113. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 593 n.8 (1977) ([Schedule II drugs] in-
clude opium and opium derivatives, cocaine, methadone, amphetamines, and
methaqualone. These drugs have accepted uses in the amelioration of pain
and in the treatment of epilepsy, narcolepsy, hyperkinesia, schizo-affective
disorders, and migraine headaches.).
114. Id. at 593.
115. Id. at 59394.
116. Id. at 607 (Brennan, J., concurring) (In this case, as the Courts opin-
ion makes clear, the States carefully designed program includes numerous
safeguards intended to forestall the danger of indiscriminate disclosure. Given
this serious and, so far as the record shows, successful effort to prevent abuse
and limit access to the personal information at issue, I cannot say that the
statutes provisions for computer storage, on their face, amount to a depriva-
tion of constitutionally protected privacy interests, any more than the more
traditional reporting provisions.).
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enforcement of the law was enjoined.117 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the statutes were within the states po-
lice power.118
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that enact-
ing legislation attempting to mitigate crime, such as attempt-
ing to impact drug distribution, was within the states police
power.119 When doing so, Justice Stevens noted two different
privacy interests: the individual interest in avoiding disclosure
of personal matters, and the ability to have independence in
making certain kinds of important decisions free from gov-
ernment influence.120 Though he agreed these privacy interests
may be affected by the New York statutes, Justice Stevens held
that neither interest would be significantly impaired based on
the high security installed by the New York Department of
Health; because the increased risk of public disclosure was
minimal compared to existing law; and because patients deci-
sions to receive these drugs would be largely unaffected by hav-
ing to provide identifying information.121 Justice Stevens went
on to dismiss both the doctors and patients concerns as a re-
sult of the security protocol.122 Though he acknowledged the
legitimate privacy concerns the plaintiffs had in the govern-
ment database of personal information,123 Justice Stevens end-
ed his opinion by limiting the holding to the specific facts in
this case, that indicated New Yorks program as a whole
showed a proper concern with, and protection of, the individu-
als interest in privacy; while the Justice noted that some oth-
er set of facts where the court did find unwarranted disclosure
of accumulated private data whether intentional or uninten-
tional could require a different analysis.124
Justice Brennan wrote a concurring opinion, where he
agreed that the required disclosure of patient information to
select public health officials is a common and normal practice
in healthcare that is historically prevalent and has not been
117. Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F. Supp. 931, 938 (D.N.Y. 1975).
118. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598.
119. Id. at 60304.
120. Id. at 598600.
121. Id. at 599604.
122. Id. at 604.
123. Id. at 605 (We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the
accumulation of vast amounts of personal information in computerized data
banks or other massive government files.).
124. Id. at 60506.
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traditionally considered an invasion of privacy.125 However, the
vast potential of this information, he found troubling:
What is more troubling about this scheme, however, is the central
computer storage of the data thus collected . . . . the Constitution puts
limits not only on the type of information the State may gather, but
also on the means it may use to gather it. The central storage and
easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential
for abuse of that information, and I am not prepared to say that fu-
ture developments will not demonstrate the necessity of some curb on
such technology.126
Whalen v. Roe involved a database of patients and information
about their lawful use of prescription drugs that police wanted
to monitor due to potential for unlawful uses.127 Diagnosis and
disease data is often more sensitive than information about the
lawful use of a prescription drug.128 The assembly of computer-
ized database systems increases both the number of users and
the number of patient records.129 The risk of invasion of priva-
cy exponentially increases as the number of participants in-
crease.130 Most existing clinical information systems were de-
signed and implemented without any significant analysis of
protection of patient privacy[;] when these systems were im-
plemented, patient privacy was simply one of many factors to
be balanced in implementing an efficient system design.131
Bioethical considerations about appropriate uses of per-
sonal medical records also present legal hurdles. Informed con-
sent may be an issue in this Initiative, considering that once
samples are taken from unknowing patients132 or samples are
125. Id. at 606 (Brennan, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 60607.
127. Id. at 591 (majority opinion).
128. Brannigan, supra note 112, at 19192 (In many cases the problem is
worse with clinical and research information systems).
129. Id.
130. See id. See generally BIG DATA, supra note 63.
131. Brannigan, supra note 112, at 19192 (describing hospital medical
records systems before HIPAA); cf. Sue Bowman, Impact of Electronic Health
Record Systems on Information Integrity: Quality and Safety Implications,
PERSP. HEALTH INFO. MGMT., Fall 2013 (noting a number of security and func-
tionality issues with electronic health care records systems both in the design
level, implementation level, and through widespread user errors).
132. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 487 (Cal.
1990) (holding, on public policy grounds, that permitting a conversion law to
encompass organs would hinder medical research, and noting that a patient
can make an informed decision to consent to medical treatment or to withhold
his or her consent and seek other treatment if the patient does not want ge-
netic material to be collected).
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used from subjects in a different research study,133 the partici-
pants are often unaware of how their information is being
used or where their information is located. A centralized repos-
itory system (such as the Initiative) that mandates notice be
given to the government when there is any use of this sort of
information, and that gives proper notice to the users, could
help alleviate this concern; the basic logistics of this idea will
be discussed more in the conclusion.134
These are not the only concerns; in private law, contractual
limitations can and do exist on the disclosure of information,
such as non-disclosure agreements135 or material-transfer
agreements.136 The law governing both of these would be the
contractual agreements between the parties, and the privacy
clauses and use restrictions would likely be material conditions
to the contract.137 To resolve contract disputes, one must turn
to economic arguments like efficient breach, which results in
optimal obligations for all parties involved.138 If consent to use
genetic information existed under an efficient breach system,
133. See, e.g., Tilousi v. Ariz. State Univ. Bd. of Regents, No. 04-CV-1290,
2005 WL 6199562, at *1 (D. Ariz. Mar. 3, 2005).
134. See infra Part III.
135. See, e.g., Data Confidentiality Agreement for Research, HARVARD PIL-
GRIM HEALTH CARE, https://www.harvardpilgrim.org/pls
/portal/url/ITEM/E6813B38458A4A3397F6C72A97019617 (last updated Oct.
2014) (requiring researchers accessing data from Harvard Pilgrim Health
Care to agree to certain non-disclosure and data stewardship practices); Univ.
of Wash. Dept of Biostatistics, Non-Disclosure Agreement, HCHS/SOL GENET-
IC ANALYSIS CTR., https://www.olgastudy.org/non-disclosure-agreement (last
visited Oct. 15, 2015) (requiring researchers to sign a non-disclosure agree-
ment before accessing a University of Washington repository of data analysis
from ongoing studies of genotypic datasets).
136. See Thomas Margoni, The Roles of Material Transfer Agreements in
Genetics Databases and Bio-Banks, in COMPARATIVE ISSUES IN THE GOVERN-
ANCE OF RESEARCH BIOBANKS 231, 23132 (Giovanni Pascuzzi et al. eds.,
2013) (The exchange of biological and research materials is becoming more
and more formalized, anddifferently from a few years agoproviding insti-
tutions now tend to impose the use of specific contract forms that detail the
rights and obligations attached to the material. Such contractual agreements
are commonly referred to as Material Transfer Agreements, or MTAS.).
137. See Alan B. Bennett et al., Specific Issues with Material Transfer
Agreements, IPHANDBOOK OF BEST PRACTICES (2007),
http://www.iphandbook.org/handbook/ch07/p03/.
138. See generally Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation,
and the Theory of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CALIF. L. REV. 629, 630 (1987);
Charles J. Goetz & Robert Scott, Liquidated Damages, Penalties and the Just
Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and Theory of
Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554, 55877 (1977).
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and if a central reporting database were available, it would
simplify the process of identifying the parties involved, thereby
streamlining the removal of information, and, subsequently,
returning the parties to a position where they would have been
had the contract not been performed. Efficient breach would
also return the benefits conferred or consideration (If there are
any) to the researcher and by removing the information of the
participants, research would incorporate a less exploitative
model of consent and participation, and thereby, avoid more of
the aforementioned historical139 or bioethical problems.140
Even if one does not agree with using contract law to gov-
ern informed consent in a biobank based on efficiency grounds,
there are also consumer protection reasons for supporting con-
tract-based regulation. Current biobank databases use broad
consent,141 which presumes any future researcher and future
research has already been consented to, by moving to contract-
based regulation of evolving consent, this model would incorpo-
rate the opt-in model of participation as compared to the cur-
rent opt-out model.142 In an opt-in system, concerned partici-
pants can have a more meaningful choice regarding the use of
their information,143 and it is possible researchers may main-
tain similar levels of participation. As a result, these altera-
tions could address privacy concerns while leaving the system
relatively intact.
139. See supra notes 2379 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 81108 and accompanying text.
141. Steinsbekk, Myskja & Solberg, supra note 82.
142. For a description of opt-out versus opt-in in the context of becoming an
organ donor, see Richard Thaler, Opt In vs. Opting Out, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/27/business/economy/27view.html
(Most states, as well as many other countries, use an opt in or explicit con-
sent rule, meaning that people must take a concrete action, like going to a
public library or requesting and mailing in a form, to declare they want to be
[organ] donors. But many who are willing . . . never get around to such steps.
An alternative approach, used in several European countries, is an opt out
rule, often called presumed consent, in which citizens are presumed to be
consenting donors unless they act to register their unwillingness. In the world
of traditional economics, it shouldnt matter whether you use an opt-in or opt-
out system . . . . But many findings of behavioral economics show that tiny
disparities in such rules can make a big difference. By comparing the consent
rates in European countries, . . . psychologists . . . have shown that the choice
of opting in or opting out is a major factor.).
143. Office of the Chief Info. Security Officer, Privacy Brief: Opt In Versus
Opt Out, UNIV. OF WASH. (May 2013), http://ciso.washington.edu/site/files
/Privacy_Brief_Opt_In.pdf.
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B. FEDERAL & STATE REPORTING SYSTEMS INVOLVING
EVIDENTIARY COLLECTION (CRIMINAL ISSUES)
In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the constitu-
tionality of certain police practices that routinely compare sus-
pect biosamples to DNA databases in Maryland v. King.144 In
King, almost six years after an unsolved case where a woman
was anonymously raped and robbed, Alonzo King was arrested
for second-degree assault in a wholly separate case.145 During
Kings arrest, police collected a DNA sample with a cheek swab,
which occurs under a Maryland law allowing for warrantless
DNA collection from anyone arrested of certain felony offens-
es.146 Kings DNA matched DNA collected from the earlier un-
solved rape, and King was tried, convicted, and sentenced to
life in prison for that crime.147 The majority held that the stat-
ute allowing police to take a DNA swab from anyone they ar-
rest for a serious crime did not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment.148 Thus, through the DNA collection protocol allowing for
storage of information in a repository for a seemingly infinite
time period, arrested persons (supposedly innocent until proven
guilty) are being genetically searched for evidence they are
connected to any past unsolved crimes.149 The Supreme Court
held that this practice was not a violation of the Fourth
Amendment as it was reasonably tailored to the police investi-
gation activities, and in doing so, the Court endorsed a practice
now followed by more than half the states and federal govern-
ment.150
144. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
145. Id. at 196566.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1980.
149. See Id. at 1986 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (DNA testing does not even
begin until after arraignment and bail decisions are already made. The sam-
ples sit in storage for months, and take weeks to test. When they are tested,
they are checked against the Unsolved Crimes Collection  rather than the
Convict and Arrestee Collection . . . . The Act . . . prescribes as its purpose
what our suspicionless-search cases forbid (official investigation into a
crime).).
150. Id. at 1968 (majority opinion) (All 50 States require the collection of
DNA from felony convicts . . . . Twenty-eight States and the Federal Govern-
ment have adopted laws similar to the Maryland Act authorizing the collection
of DNA from some or all arrestees. Although those statutes vary in their par-
ticulars, such as what charges require a DNA sample, their similarity means
that this case implicates more than the specific Maryland law. At issue is a
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Before King, many have argued that these systems repre-
sent a wholly unconstitutional practice.151 While now constitu-
tional, DNA repositories of this magnitude fosters nearly un-
limited power, and have fundamentally changed the entire
manner of criminal convictions and evidentiary collection pro-
cesses.152 Almost half the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly recog-
nized this issue. In a dissent, Justice Scalia (joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) stated:
Make no mistake about it: As an entirely predictable consequence of
todays decision, your DNA can be taken and entered into a national
DNA database if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for
whatever reason.
. . . .
Todays judgment will, to be sure, have the beneficial effect of
solving more crimes; then again, so would the taking of DNA samples
from anyone who flies on an airplane (surely the Transportation Se-
curity Administration needs to know the identity of the flying pub-
lic), applies for a drivers license, or attends a public school. Perhaps
the construction of such a genetic panopticon is wise. But I doubt that
standard, expanding technology already in widespread use throughout the
Nation. (citation omitted)).
151. Aaron B. Chapin, Note, Arresting DNA: Privacy Expectations of Free
Citizens Versus Post-Convicted Persons and the Unconstitutionality of DNA
Dragnets, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1842, 1856 (2005) (DNA acts push the boundaries
of constitutionality and survive primarily because of the status of the individ-
ual as a post-convicted person. When individuals subjected to testing do not
have diminished privacy expectations, as in the context of DNA dragnets, the
government interest in compelling DNA collection fails to outweigh the intru-
sion upon the individual under the reasonableness balancing test. Without a
non-law enforcement purpose in collecting DNA in mass sweeps, the special
needs exception does not apply. Nor can a DNA sample be compelled as part
of an investigatory stop, because the seizure of DNA falls outside the scope of
the Terry stop-and-frisk exception. The only way to obtain a DNA sample from
a nonsuspect, free citizen is through consent, but the very purpose behind the
DNA dragnet may make voluntary consent practically impossible. Therefore,
DNA searches of free citizens without individualized suspicion are unconstitu-
tional.).
152. Yale H. Yee, Criminal DNA Data Banks: Revolution for Law Enforce-
ment or Threat to Individual Privacy?, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 461, 489 (1995)
(However, such data banks pose numerous problems in the realm of individu-
al privacy. Although the bare fingerprint may not contain significant genetic
information, a great danger exists in the storage of blood or saliva samples.
Unauthorized access to these samples can result in serious breaches of indi-
vidual privacy. Current DNA technology applied to analysis of such samples
can yield a wealth of information about an individual which may serve as the
basis for genetic discrimination by insurance companies, employers, or educa-
tion facilities, and pose the threat of stigmatization or adverse emotional con-
sequences. Procedural safeguards can be set in place that will adequately pro-
tect against potential breaches of privacy.).
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the proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would have been
so eager to open their mouths for royal inspection.153
As a result, it is uncontested that these new police search pow-
ers protected in King hold vast potential and controversial out-
comes.154
Historically, certain individual rights and privileges pro-
tected by the constitution and granted by federal and state law
are removed when a person has been convicted of a felony con-
viction, including: disbarment or engaging in a business rela-
tionship with the government,155 voting rights and jury ser-
vice,156 firearm ownership,157 serving in the armed forces,158
flying aircraft,159 holding private radio licenses,160 holding oth-
er Federal Licenses,161 holding federal offices,162 receiving fed-
153. King, 133 S. Ct. at 1989 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
154. Chapin, supra note 151.
155. E.g., 10 U.S.C. § 2408 (2012) (providing for a five year ban on con-
tracting for the government if fraud or a felony occurs during a contract with
the Department of Defense); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (2012) (excluding from fu-
ture health benefits persons that commit fraud in obtaining health benefits);
21 U.S.C. § 335a (2012) (excluding from participating in drug applications to
the FDA any person that commits a felony in the process of submitting drug
applications to FDA).
156. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (holding that disen-
franchisement of persons with a felony record even after completion of prison
sentences and parole does not deny equal protection.); Iowa Code § 48A.6(1)
(2012) (disqualify from registering to vote and from voting persons with a fel-
ony record); Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.915(6)(a) (2015) (barring persons with a felony
record from serving on a jury). But see 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2012) (allowing
a person with a felony record to serve on a federal jury if they have received a
pardon from a states governor).
157. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1), (g) (2012) (preventing a person with a felony
record from buying, receiving, transporting, or possessing any firearm or am-
munition).
158. 10 U.S.C. § 504 (2012).
159. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 44703, 4410144103, 44106, 44703(e), 44709, 44710
(2012) (restricting the ability to receive or renew a pilots license or aircraft
registration for felony convictions over controlled substances).
160. See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a) (2012) (allowing revocation of a radio license for
a communications related or controlled substance felony conviction).
161. E.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(1)(B) (2012) (allowing revocation of a custom
broker license if a person is convicted of a felony associated with importation
or trade); 21 U.S.C. § 823 (2012) (restricting licenses to manufacture or dis-
tribute a controlled substance); 22 U.S.C. § 2778(g)(3)(A)(B) (2012) (restrict-
ing licenses to export or import arms); 50 U.S.C. app. § 2410(h)(1) (2012) (re-
stricting licenses to export); 5 FCC Rcd. 3252, 3252 (1990) (retaining
discretion for the FCC to make licensing decisions based on character of an
applicant related to both FCC-related misconduct and non-FCC-related ac-
tions).
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eral employment,163 and receiving federal benefits164 among
other things. This said, is the loss of genetic data privacy rights
akin to these rights and is the commission of a crime sufficient
to surrender this unlimited knowledge repository to govern-
ment?165
Some commentators have categorized privacy concerns
with criminal justice and DNA repositories to occur in two pri-
mary instances.166 First, there is a governmental intrusion,
both physical and psychological, when DNA is collected, used,
and stored in a database; an intrusion that is compounded
when it occurs multiple times without the individuals
knowledge or consent.167 Second, the governments potentially
perpetual retention of a biological sample, marks an intrusion,
as the sample holds an incalculable reservoir of personal in-
formation about both the individual and the individuals fami-
ly.168 Are these programs narrowly tailored to sufficiently fulfill
the bioethical considerations,169 or are these disclosures begin-
ning to branch into the historical controversies DNA has previ-
ously faced?170
C. FEDERAL CREATION OF CODIS
To better understand the implications of genetic surveil-
lance in a civil context, we must first look to the history of ge-
162. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (providing for removal and disqualification
to hold . . . any Office of honor, Trust or Profit upon impeachment of an offi-
cial by the Senate); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (providing for removal from office
of the President, Vice President and all civil Officers upon impeachment for
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors).
163. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7313 (2012) (barring federal employment for five
years after conviction of a riot or civil disorder offense); 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)
(2012) (for corruption of a public official); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1905, 1913, 2387, 2385
(2012) (removal from office for various violation of public trust); 26 U.S.C. §§
7213, 7214 (2012) (for unauthorized disclosures of tax return information).
164. 5 U.S.C. § 862 (2012) (denying federal benefits for certain controlled
substance convictions).
165. See generally Yee, supra note 152.
166. DUSTIN HAYS & SARA KATSANIS, GENETICS & PUB. POLY CTR., DNA,
FORENSICS, AND THE LAW 2 (2007), [http://www.policyarchive.org
/handle/10207/9650].
167. Id.
168. Id.; see Roy Gilbar, Communicating Genetic Information in the Fami-
ly: The Familial Relationship as the Forgotten Factor, 33 J. MED. ETHICS 390,
390 (2007).
169. See supra notes 9093 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 2364 and accompanying text.
2016] RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN 469
netic surveillance by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
Central to Maryland v. King is the FBIs use of a DNA reposi-
tory system.171 The FBI does the criminal investigation for the
federal government, and is housed in the Department of Jus-
tice.172 The mission statement of the FBI states:
[a]s an intelligence-driven and a threat-focused national security or-
ganization with both intelligence and law enforcement responsibili-
ties, the mission of the FBI is to protect and defend the United States
against terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, to uphold and en-
force the criminal laws of the United States, and to provide leader-
ship and criminal justice services to federal, state, municipal, and in-
ternational agencies and partners.173
The FBI is charged with gathering and reporting facts, locat-
ing witnesses, and compiling evidence in cases involving Fed-
eral jurisdiction . . . provid[ing] law enforcement leadership and
assistance to State and international law enforcement agen-
cies.174 The Bureaus role is to investigate all violations of fed-
eral law except those legislatively or otherwise delegated to an-
other agency.175
The Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) began in 1990
as a pilot project by the FBI in conjunction with fourteen state
and local laboratories.176 CODIS and National DNA Index Sys-
tem (NDIS) were both officially established in 1998 following
the passage of the DNA Identification Act of 1994 by Con-
gress.177 The legislative authorization of CODIS required the
FBI to establish quality assurance standards ensuring that
DNA records were treated with integrity when being entered
into the system and that strict limitations were placed on the
data that could be entered into CODIS and how that data could
171. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 198990 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
172. Federal Bureau of Investigation, FED. REG.,
https://www.federalregister.gov/agencies/federal-bureau-of-investigation (last
visited Feb. 9, 2015).
173. Quick Facts, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/quick-facts (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
174. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, supra note 172.
175. Id.
176. See W. MARK DALE ET AL., DNA FORENSICS: EXPANDING USES AND
INFORMATION SHARING 8 (2006), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dnaf.pdf.
177. Id.; CODIS Brochure, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis_brochure (last
visited Feb. 9, 2015).
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subsequently be used.178 CODIS generally uses Rapid DNA, or
Rapid DNA Analysis, which is the process for creating a CODIS
Core Short Tandem Repeat (STR) profile from a cheek swab
sample via fully automated extraction, amplification, separa-
tion, detection and allele calling.179 As of 2006, CODIS con-
tained over 3.3 million DNA profiles of convicted offenders,
over 142,000 DNA profiles from crime scenes, and the system
has produced 36,000 matches to previously unsolved crimes in
fourty-nine states.180 As there is no formal interface between
CODIS and any criminal history record information systems,
CODIS does not include any personally identifying infor-
mation about the subject of the DNA sample.181 In general,
states have followed the federal database architecture and have
not added personally identifying information, with some states
expressly prohibiting any connections between criminal history
record information and DNA profiles.182
Looking to the administrative structure of the program,
the Department of Justice houses CODIS, which, in turn, has
the NDIS, which, in turn, houses the Rapid DNA Index System
(RDIS).183 At the FBI, the Rapid DNA Program Office directs
the development and integration of Rapid DNA technology for
use by law enforcement.184 Essentially, all federal agencies,
state and local agencies have access to the system. Further, the
FBI has fully integrated the system to be capable of performing
cheek swab STR analysis in one to two hours and initiating
DNA enrollment and searches from a police booking station.185
This system allows for police to match cheek swaps against a
178. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., DEPT OF JUSTICE, AUDIT REPORT:
THE COMBINED DNA INDEX SYSTEM (2001), http://www.justice.gov/
oig/reports/FBI/a0126/final.pdf.
179. Rapid DNA or Rapid DNA Analysis, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
[hereinafter Rapid DNA], http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-
analysis/codis/rapid-dna-analysis (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
180. DALE ET AL., supra note 176.
181. Id. at 1.
182. Id.
183. Rapid DNA, supra note 179.
184. Id. (The Program Office works with the Department of Defense, the
Department of Homeland Security, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology, the National Institute of Justice, and other federal agencies to
ensure the coordinated development of this new technology among federal
agencies. The Program Office also works with state and local law enforcement
agencies and state bureaus of identification . . . to facilitate the effective and
efficient integration of Rapid DNA [in the state criminal justice system].).
185. Id.
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national index.186 However, the FBI states that it makes mini-
mal use of Rapid DNA on crime scene samples:
At this time, these [the FBIs] goals do not include the use of
Rapid DNA technology on crime scene (forensic) samples because of
the differences between forensic and known reference (offend-
er/arrestee) samples. These differences may include the nature or
type of sample, typical sample quantity and potential for reanalysis.
A forensic sample may not be amenable to fully automated processing
due to limitations in its quality and quantity.187
In conflict with this statement of the bureaus goals is the crea-
tion of forensic sample databases.
In its original form, CODIS consisted of two indices: the Forensic
Index and the Convicted Offender Index. The Forensic Index contains
evidentiary profiles developed from biological material such as semen,
saliva, or blood found at crime scenes. The Convicted Offender Index
contains profiles of individuals convicted of crimes specified by State
laws. All 50 states have passed DNA legislation authorizing the col-
lection of DNA profiles from certain convicted offenders for submis-
sion to CODIS. In recent years, CODIS has added new indices; in-
cluding the Arrestee Index, the Missing or Unidentified Persons
Index, and the Missing Persons Reference Index. CODIS automatical-
ly searches across these indices for a potential match to aid criminal
investigations of crimes from which unknown biological evidence has
been recovered.188
When a hit (or positive match) is obtained from a convicted
offender or arrestee sample, the hit is typically viewed as
probable cause, thereby allowing for the government to take
additional DNA sample(s) from the suspect for confirmatory
purposes by the laboratory.189 Thus, some have speculated the
system bypasses the Fourth Amendments mandate of a war-
rant for a reasonable search or seizure.190
While the idea of CODIS might be problematic in the ab-
stract, the systems actual implementation and management
have attracted significant detractors and proven to be rife with
conflicts.191 The actual operation of the system may extend be-
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. History of DNA Databases, MD. GOVERNORS OFF. OF CRIME CONTROL
& PREVENTION, http://www.goccp.maryland.gov/dna/database.php (last visited
Nov. 30, 2015).
189. Id.
190. See Chapin, supra note 151.
191. See James Cass, The Cost of Making Crime Not Pay: Obama, CODIS
and Forensic DNA, GENOMICS L. REP. (Mar. 23, 2010),
http://www.genomicslawreport.com/index.php/2010/03/23/the-cost-of-making-
crime-not-pay-obama-codis-and-forensic-dna/ (discussing criticisms of CODIS
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yond the intended statutory authority provided by the DNA
Identification Act of 1994.192 The management of the database
is a cause of concern because the accuracy of decisions made off
the database have significant impacts on peoples lives. An au-
dit by the Department of Justice found that the FBI imple-
mented CODIS (and companion program(s)) nationwide, but
largely failed to conduct mandatory monitoring of program ac-
countabilityof the eight state and local laboratories dis-
closed in the audit, four laboratories did not fully comply with
the FBIs quality assurance standards and national index re-
quirements.193 These laboratories subsequently agreed to per-
form corrective actions to resolve operational deficits,194 yet it
remains the case that 50% of laboratories audited were out of
compliance. More troubling, the labs had been required for
years prior to have annual audits for quality assurance, but
labs were not reporting audit results to the FBI and instead
the laboratories contributing DNA profiles to the national in-
dex simply certified that they had been audited and that they
were in compliance with the legislation and quality assurance
standards.195
Access to identifiable information in the CODIS database
is highly restricted and limited by physical and administrative
barriers.196 Access to these computers is limited to only those
implementation, such as the widespread practice of investigating partial
matches who are likely relatives to some degree of the perpetrator and now
guilt[y] by genetic association, and the FBIs obstruction of external reviews
of the false positive rate for matches given current cutoffs and practices on the
number of alleles and locations that must align before a profile is considered a
match).
192. DNA Identification Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2069
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 14132).
193. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 178, at iii.
194. Id.
195. Id. at iiiii.
196. Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) on the CODIS Program and the
National DNA Index System, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/biometric-analysis/codis/codis-and-ndis-fact-
sheet (last visited Feb. 9, 2015) (The computer terminals/servers containing
the CODIS software are located in physically secure space at a criminal justice
agency. Access to these computers is limited to only those individuals author-
ized to use CODIS and approved by the FBI. Communications between partic-
ipating federal, state, and local laboratories occur over a wide area network
accessible to only criminal justice agencies approved by the FBI. Pursuant to
federal law (the DNA Identification Act of 1994), DNA data is confidential.
Access is restricted to criminal justice agencies for law enforcement identifica-
tion purposes. Defendants are also permitted access to the samples and anal-
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individuals authorized to use CODIS and approved by the
FBI.197 However, as soon as information is de-identified, it can
be used by authorized entities for research and protocol devel-
opment purposes.198 Thus, pursuant to the DNA Identification
Act of 1994199 and the Freedom of Information Act,200 these da-
ta can be divulged to approved researchers; it is unclear if the
Initiative will have access to this information.
D. FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) gives citizens a
right to access the federal governments information.201 Specifi-
cally, the act provides a right to access federal agency records,
unless the records are subject to any of nine exemptions that
allow denial of the request or redaction of exempt portions of
the record.202 A FOIA request can be made for any agency rec-
ord.203 Federal agencies (including the FBI and NIH204) are re-
yses performed in connection with their cases. If all personally identifiable
information is removed, DNA profile information may be accessed by criminal
justice agencies for a population statistics database, for identification research
and protocol development purposes, or for quality control purposes. The unau-
thorized disclosure of DNA data in the National DNA database is subject to a
criminal penalty not to exceed $250,000.).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. (The DNA Identification Act of 1994 (42 U.S.C. §14132) author-
ized the establishment of this National DNA Index. The DNA Act specifies the
categories of data that may be maintained in NDIS (convicted offenders, ar-
restees, legal, detainees, forensic (casework), unidentified human remains,
missing persons and relatives of missing persons) as well as requirements for
participating laboratories relating to quality assurance, privacy and ex-
pungement.).
200. See infra notes 20121 and accompanying text.
201. Freedom of Information Act Homepage, U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE,
http://www.foia.gov (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
202. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2), (a)(3) (2012) (requiring that each agency to
promptly make available for public inspection and copying all records,
regardless of form or format); 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(9) (listing exemptions to
FOIA production, including exemption (b)(6) for medical files and similar files
the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy and exemption (b)(7) for records or information compiled for
law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production would
interfere with a proceeding, deprive a person of rights, constitute an invasion
of privacy, discloses a confidential source, discloses a law enforcement tech-
nique, or endangers life or physical safety); see also What is FOIA?, U.S. DEPT
OF JUSTICE, http://www.foia.gov/about.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).
203. What is FOIA?, supra note 202.
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quired to have distinct systems for production of information
requested under FOIA.205
Since there are different state laws regarding health priva-
cy, there have been calls for a single, uniform, comprehensive
set of federal laws to govern health privacy.206 Congress has
been unable to pass such federal legislation,207 although
HIPAA and GINA now prevent some of the more egregious vio-
lations of medical privacy, and the privacy provisions of the
Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical
Health (HITECH) Act extend HIPAA restrictions to the busi-
ness associates of a covered entity.208 The Privacy Act of 1974
regulates how federal agencies disseminate personal infor-
mation.209 Federal agencies use these FOIA exceptions to resist
204. Requesting FBI Records, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
http://www.fbi.gov/foia/requesting-fbi-records (last visited Feb. 9, 2015) (The
Freedom of Information Act allows any personexcept fugitives, federal agen-
cies, and foreign intelligence agenciesto request information about organiza-
tions, businesses, investigations, historical events, incidents, groups, or de-
ceased persons.); Freedom of Information Act Office, NATL INST. OF HEALTH,
http://www.nih.gov/icd/od/foia/ (last modified Oct. 6, 2015) (The NIH FOIA
office generally handles three different categories of requests: requests for
information maintained by the Office of the Director, NIH requests that in-
volve trans NIH issues or initiatives unless a specific IC has responsibility,
requests for information that will not be released because it is protected by
one or more of the FOIAs nine exemptions or three exclusions).
205. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(A)(E) (requiring each agency to publish regula-
tions to offer guidance to the public on how requests are handled, and rules of
procedure for making and fulfilling requests).
206. See generally THE CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, NOTHING SACRED: THE
POLITICS OF PRIVACY 2628 (1998) (describing cases of employees being fired
based on health records, and disclosures of health status and history by hospi-
tal workers in the years before some protections were created by HIPAA and
GINA); Charity Scott, Is Too Much Privacy Bad for Your Health? An Introduc-
tion to the Law, Ethics, and HIPAA Rule on Medical Privacy, 17 GA. ST. U.L.
REV. 481, 508 (2000) (same).
207. See THE CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, supra note 206; Scott, supra note
206.
208. Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health
(HITECH) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 13401, 123 Stat. 226, 260 (2009) (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. § 17931) (applying the same administrative, technical, and
physical security safeguard requirements of covered firms to business associ-
ates).
209. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (No agency shall disclose any record which is con-
tained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or
to another agency, except pursuant to a written request by, or with the prior
written consent of, the individual to whom the record pertains . . . .); see
Scott, supra note 206.
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disclosure of personal information including health data and
patient research records.210
This said, researchers are not bound to the same laws the
physicians or covered health services organizations are.211 Spe-
cifically, existing regulation of biomedical research . . . occurs
at two levels.212 First, federal law requires researchers to
submit proposals for studies of human subjects to expert pan-
els, which must judge those proposals based on adherence to
federal regulations for the protection of human subjects, and,
second, the individual research subjects must be fully in-
formed about the nature, scope, and risks of the research and
agree formally to participate in it.213 These requirements are
spelled out in the Federal Research Regulations.214 That said,
subsequent use of these data sets, where participants have giv-
en no consent, runs rampant in medical research.215 Further,
case law has shown that there is no private cause of action un-
der the federal research regulations.216 Consumer advocacy
groups urged Congress to adopt laws mandating that research
using medical records undergo IRB-like review allowing re-
searchers to proceed without express informed consent only if
consent were impracticable and if confidentiality safeguards
were in place.217 Yet health plans and pharmacies have object-
ed, claiming such procedures would impose confidentiality du-
ties (and estimated high costs) beyond traditional scientific re-
search projects into routine health care operations such as
outcome research, disease management programs, or other ac-
tivities aimed at improving the quality of care.218
210. See Scott, supra note 206.
211. Henry T. Greely, The Control of Genetic Research: Involving the
Groups Between, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1397, 1399402 (1997).
212. Id. at 1399.
213. Id. at 1399400.
214. 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2009).
215. See generally Tilousi v. Ariz. State Univ. Bd. of Regents, No. 04-CV-
1290, 2005 WL 6199562, at *2 (As to plaintiffs [research participants] claim
that they had a fiduciary relationship with all defendants [genetic research-
ers], plaintiffs allege no facts sufficient to establish such a relationship. As
defendants point out, plaintiffs do not even allege that any of the defendants
accepted the trust and confidence of plaintiffs, but instead plaintiffs allega-
tions focus on [their reliance on the first researcher].).
216. ANDREWS, MEHLMAN & ROTHSTEIN supra note 23, at 155.
217. Scott, supra note 206, at 518 (describing advocacy efforts to pass pri-
vacy protections in the 1990s prior to the HIPAA Privacy Rule).
218. Id.; Geri Aston, Privacy Policy Will Have Impact Any Way It Ends Up,
AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 15, 1999, at 5.
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Alternatively, those restrictions and protocols on data
sharing often do not apply in the criminal context, where the
FBI operates under a much different paradigm.219 Currently,
HIPAA allows officers to gain access to medical records without
obtaining of a search warrant or even notice to patients.220
Consumer groups and civil rights organizations have advocated
for new federal privacy laws to create tougher standards before
law enforcement officers could get medical records, but no sub-
stantial changes have occurred.221
219. See Scott, supra note 206, at 520.
220. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f); FAQ on Government Access to Medical Records,
ACLU [hereinafter FAQ on Government Access], https://www.aclu.org/faq-
government-access-medical-records?redirect=technology-and-liberty/faq-
government-access-medical-records (last visited Oct. 16, 2015) (The HIPAA
rules provide a wide variety of circumstances under which medical infor-
mation can be disclosed for law enforcement-related purposes without explicit-
ly requiring a warrant. These circumstances include (1) . . . requests for in-
formation to identify or locate a suspect, fugitive, witness, or missing person
(2) instances where there has been a crime committed on the premises of the
covered entity, and (3) in a medical emergency in connection with a crime. In
other words, law enforcement is entitled to your records simply by asserting
that you are a suspect or the victim of a crime . . . . Section 215 of the Patriot
Act allows the FBI Director or his designee to get a court order . . . requiring
the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, docu-
ments, and other items) for an investigation to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investiga-
tion of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activi-
ties protected by the first amendment to the Constitution. This power appears
to apply to medical records.).
221. FAQ on Government Access, supra note 220 (The ACLU believes that
this easy, warrantless access to our medical information violates the U.S.
Constitution, especially the Fourth Amendment, which generally bars the
government from engaging in unreasonable searches and seizures. However,
because the Patriot Act and the HIPAA regulations have only recently gone
into effect, their constitutionality remains largely untested, although at least
one legal challenge to the HIPAA rules is underway, and more challenges are
likely.); see, e.g., Medical Records Confidentiality in a Changing Health Care
Environment: Hearing on S. 881 and S. 578 Before the S. Comm. on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions, 106th Cong. 1 (1999) (statement of Ronald H.
Weich, legislative consultant, Am. Civil Liberties Union); Alissa J. Rubin, Pri-
vacy Initiatives Elicits Praise, Concern, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1999, at A12;
Scott, supra note 206.
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E. EUROPEAN RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN
1. History of the Right to be Forgotten
European Union Directive 95/46/EC was issued in 1995.222
This directive did not explicitly outline the current right to be
forgotten.223 When it was issued, Article 12 of the Directive
95/46/EC, the EU gave a legal basis, however not explicit pri-
vacy, for internet protection for individuals.224 Specifically, it
describes the ability for individuals to determine the develop-
ment of their life in an autonomous way, without being perpet-
ually or periodically stigmatized as a consequence of a specific
action performed in the past.225 As suggested, this is a deriva-
tion from a right, originally accorded to criminals who had
served time, to have their records expunged so that theyre able
to start life over; the this right is premised on the policy of re-
habilitation.226 In Europe, though, this right to be forgotten
has extended beyond solely the criminal sphere and into a gen-
eral concern that includes even civil matters in cyberspace, and
acknowledges that without such a right, humans may never
grow past the moment of our greatest humiliation.227
The right was articulated and generalized in EU case law
in 2014, in Google Spain v. González.228 In this case, a resident
of Spain, Mario Costeja González, filed
a complaint against La Vanguardia Ediciones SL (the publisher of a
daily newspaper with a large circulation in Spain . . . ) and against
Google Spain and Google Inc . . . . contend[ing] that, when an internet
user entered his name in the search engine of the Google group
(Google Search), the list of results would display links to two pages
of La Vanguardias newspaper, of January and March 1998. Those
222. See European Commission, Factsheet on the Right to be Forgotten
Ruling (C-131/12), at 2 (July 8, 2014), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_data_protection_en.pdf; Court of Justice of
the European Union Press Release No. 70/14, Judgment in Case C-131/12
Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (May
13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-
05/cp140070en.pdf.
223. European Commission, supra note 222.
224. Alessandro Mantelero, The EU Proposal for a General Data Protection
Regulation and the Roots of the Right to Be Forgotten, 29 COMPUTER L. &
SECURITY REV. 229, 232 (2013).
225. Id. at 230.
226. Williams, supra note 3.
227. Id.
228. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL, Google Inc. v. Agencia Espanola de
Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González, 2014 E.C.R. 317.
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pages . . . contained an announcement for a real-estate auction organ-
ised following attachment proceedings for the recovery of social secu-
rity debts owed by . . . González.229
First, González requested
that La Vanguardia be required either to remove or alter those pages
so that the personal data relating to him no longer appeared or to use
certain tools made available by search engines in order to protect the
data. Second, he requested that Google Spain or Google Inc. be re-
quired to remove or conceal the personal data relating to him so that
they ceased to be included in the search results and . . . in the links to
La Vanguardia.230
He argued that the attachment proceedings concerning him
had been fully resolved for a number of years and now were
irrelevant.231 The European Court found that search engines
like Google must remove information that is inadequate, irrel-
evant or no longer relevant when a member of the public so
requests.232 The ruling seems broad enough to apply to re-
solved debts, revenge porn, indeed any information that affects
peoples honor, dignity or privacy.233
2. The Right to Be Forgotten and the Precision Medicine
Initiative
Perhaps the most difficult area of discussion revolving
around a right to be forgotten is what the right would actual-
ly entail and what this even means; some claim this rights
ambiguity would cause more problems as opposed to presenting
solutions.234 In the context of genetic information and the Pre-
cision Medicine Initiative, the right to be forgotten would entail
an individuals ability to withdrawn their genetic information
from research uses. Such a right is needed as a solution to
many of the difficult issues the medical research community
has faced with informed consent, which will only become ampli-
fied in a big data world.
229. Court of Justice of the European Union, supra note 222.
230. Google Spain SL, 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶ 15.
231. Id.
232. Id. ¶ 93.
233. Williams, supra note 3.
234. See Luciano Floridi, Right to Be Forgotten Poses More Questions than
Answers, GUARDIAN (Nov. 11, 2014, 5:54 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/nov/11/right-to-be-forgotten-
more-questions-than-answers-google (noting the potential problems as dis-
cussed at a Google advisory council meeting).
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[F]or better or worse, the Internet has become a sort of historical rec-
ord, and search engines are its indispensable catalog . . . .
Some of the best features of the Internet  the vast amount of
information it makes available, its openness, its ability to connect us-
ers around the globe  are also the ones that conflict most sharply
with individual privacy. Once information posted online, words and
images can be duplicated so rapidly and preserved so cheaply that
they become nearly impossible to erase.235
In the context of genetic information, and specifically this mas-
sive database to be compiled by NIH, this would suggest far-
reaching, nearly endless possibility for information use that
would bypass the protections of HIPAA and GINA regulations.
With genetics, the problem is much larger than simply
misinformation, like that suffered in the Google Spain case.
First, since the data processed from various individuals would
have been authorized (or forfeited) in previous research con-
texts, the consents and authorizations from the earlier studies
may be legally sufficient for inclusion in the new database
meaning an individual that provided broad consent for use of
their samples previously may not know how widely their sam-
ples are eventually used.236 Although Department of Health
and Human Services regulations require authorization or
waiver from the individual to the extent their protected health
information would be involved in the development of research
repositories and databases for future research purposes, there
are data sets where existing, broadly-given research authoriza-
tions would not need an individuals new consent, and even
when it would be needed, an IRB panel could waive the re-
quirement.237
235. Editorial Board, Do Americans Deserve a Right to Be Forgotten Rule
from Google?, L.A. TIMES (July 16, 2015, 5:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-google-right-to-be-forgotten-
20150716-story.html.
236. See FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, PRIVACY ISSUES IN THE SHARING OF GE-
NETIC INFORMATION 23 (2014), http://www.personalizedmedicinebulletin
.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/205/2014/09
/PrivacyIssuesintheSharingofGeneticInformation.pdf (describing situations
where a covered entity would be permitted to use and disclose PHI [protect-
ed health information] for research purposes, without an individuals authori-
zation, including when broad consent was given even for unknown future
uses, and when an IRB panel determines a waiver for individual authorization
is permissible (footnotes omitted)).
237. Id. (An IRB operating under a federal-wide assurance or a privacy
board that functions under the Privacy Rule may grant a waiver or alteration
of written authorization if the proposed use or disclosure will pose minimal
risk to participants privacy, the research could not practicably be conducted
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Second, [c]ollection and use of a limited data set (which
may include geographic information other than street address,
all elements of dates and ages, and certain other unique identi-
fying characteristics or codes) is allowed.238 This type of mostly
de-identified data is still regulated and would require users to
sign data use contracts assuring that no attempt to re-identify
the dataset will be made.239 NIH currently controls access to
genetic information by encouraging researchers to use only
these partially de-identified datasets; but identity tracking at-
tacks have been shown to be capable of re-identifying about six-
ty percent of people in the U.S. based on only birth date, sex,
and zip code, while attacks using even partial genetic infor-
mation can allow identification without geographic or personal
metadata.240 However, de-identified data is not protected
health information under HIPAA, so it is not regulated by
HIPAA or subject to its protections.241 At that point, the tradi-
tional bounds of information privacy protections no longer have
teeth, however, in a world of big data, what might be consid-
ered de-identified to meet HIPAA requirements, may still be re-
identified given the amount of information available on the in-
ternet.242 In NIH draft documents concerning how to handle
privacy concerns, advisors seem to both acknowledge these
complexities, but nonetheless believe that restrictions in data
use contracts will be adequate.243
without the waiver or alteration of authorization and cannot be conducted
using de-identified information, and other specified criteria are met.).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 3 (A Covered entity may release a limited data set if the re-
searcher signs a data use agreement (DUA), which assures the Covered entity
that the recipient will protect the limited data set and will not make any effort
to re-identify individuals using the data set.).
240. Erlich & Narayanan, supra note 105, at 40911, 41417.
241. See FOLEY & LARDNER LLP, supra note 236.
242. Erlich & Narayanan, supra note 105, at 41016 (describing different
types of identity tracing attacks that can be used to re-identify individuals in
de-identified DNA data sets).
243. PRECISION MEDICINE INITIATIVE (PMI) WORKING GROUP, THE PRECI-
SION MEDICINE INITIATIVE COHORT PROGRAM  BUILDING A RESEARCH FOUN-
DATION FOR 21ST CENTURY MEDICINE 72 (2015), http://acd.od.nih.gov/reports
/DRAFT-PMI-WG-Report-9-11-2015-508.pdf ([T]he proliferation of data min-
ing methods and potential naming sources (voter lists, public registries, social
media postings, ancestry web sites, etc.) means that technology alone will be
insufficient to address issues of data privacy for the PMI cohort . . . . Accepta-
ble use policies with substantial enforceable sanctions will need to be devel-
oped or adapted from other similar research efforts . . . .).
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What is proposed as a solution here? Simply, a method of
removal of this information from the database, and a right to
remove subsequent links to this data from publically available
sources of this information including government publications
and search engines. The management of this right may need to
differ between civil and criminal contexts; however, a mecha-
nism needs to be in place in order to limit the disclosure of this
vast array of information as this information stretches far be-
yond the traditional bounds of freedom of speech.244
Some argue there are massive problems with this sort of
approach, and believe it leaves critical unresolved flaws, in-
cluding: creating a two-tiered approach to information without
a way to deal with information categorization; creating a pseu-
do-territoriality of the law that conflicts with the non-
territoriality of the internet; creating a conflict between the
right to be forgotten and the right to information which are
both proxies of protected privacy rights; how to delineate rele-
vance of personal information independent of the purpose for
seeking the information; and the conflict between public inter-
est and what is interesting to the public.245 Not all of these
concerns can be addressed in the conclusion of this note (as
there is no federal right proposed), however some general as-
pects of these concerns can be addressed.
3. Why Not Expungement?
Some would claim that expungement proceedings246 could
be used to remove genetic information from databases, and
244. See Debra Greenfield, The Protection of Human Genetic Information
and the First Amendment, UCLA INST. FOR SOCY & GENETICS,
http://socgen.ucla.edu/research/the-protection-of-human-genetic-information-
and-the-first-amendment-beyond-intellectual-property-paradigms/ (Green-
field argues that the First Amendment and guarantees of freedom of speech
and expression should be invoked in cases and controversies regarding ones
rights to both their private genetic information as well as the totality of infor-
mation of the Human Genome); see also Debra Greenfield, Intangible or Em-
bodied Information: The Non-Statutory Nature of Human Genetic Material, 25
SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 467, 467 (2009) (DNA sequences
represent exceptions to patentable subject matter as laws of nature.).
245. Floridi, supra note 234; see Mark Scott, Google Details Problems with
Handling Right to Be Forgotten Requests, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2014, 1:22 PM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/31/google-details-problems-with-
handling-right-to-be-forgotten-requests/.
246. See Criminal Expungement, MINN. JUD. BRANCH [hereinafter Crimi-
nal Expungement], http://www.mncourts.gov/Help-Topics/Criminal-
Expungement.aspx (last visited Oct. 16, 2015) (Expungement is the process of
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would rectify problems arising from extended use of genetic
information without creating conflicts with First Amendment
protections.247 However, expungement remedies are generally
only allotted to those who have been through criminal proceed-
ings.248 Further, expungement proceedings fail to recognize
that the nature, quality, quantity, and historical and sociocul-
tural context that genetic information contains makes any full
recovery from past disclosure impossible.249 Further, expunge-
ment remedies are extremely limited to state statutes; the Se-
cond Circuit posited that when looking at expungement pro-
ceedings, the law only requires that certain official records be
erased. The few enumerated exceptions to the erasure re-
quirements . . . confirm that the legislature contemplated eras-
ure only in the context of the judicial and law enforcement sys-
tems.250 However, even if an individual is entitled to an
going to court to ask a judge to seal a court record. It is important to remem-
ber that an expunged record is NOT destroyed. The police, FBI, immigration
officers, and other public officials may still see sealed court files for certain
purposes. Usually, people ask for an expungement when they have been de-
nied a job, housing, or a professional license because of their criminal back-
ground.).
247. For examples of courts balancing the First Amendment and the ex-
pungement of criminal records, see, for example, G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300,
31516 (N.J. 2011) ([T]he expungement statute does not transmute a once-
true fact into a falsehood. It does not require the excision of records from the
historical archives of newspapers or bound volumes of reported decisions or a
personal diary . . . . It is not intended to create an Orwellian scheme whereby
previously public informationlong maintained in official recordsnow be-
comes beyond the reach of public discourse on penalty of a defamation action.
Although our expungement statute generally permits a person whose record
has been expunged to misrepresent his past, it does not alter the metaphysical
truth of his past, nor does it impose a regime of silence on those who know the
truth.); Bahr v. Statesman Journal Co., 624 P.2d 664, 666 (Or. Ct. App. 1981)
(The expungement statute does not, however, impose any duty on members of
the public who are aware of the conviction to pretend that it does not exist. In
other words, the statute authorizes certain persons to misrepresent their own
past. It does not make that representation true.).
248. See Criminal Expungement, supra note 246.
249. See supra Part I.
250. Martin v. Hearst Co., 777 F.3d 536, 551 & n.4 (2d Cir. 2015)
([F]ingerprints, pictures and descriptions and other identification da-
ta . . . are not among the records whose disclosure is governed . . . [t]he fun-
damental purpose of the [expungement] statute is served by permitting lim-
ited disclosure of the records to counsel for the state in order for it to take
reasonable steps to defend itself against [the defendants] threatened action
while sealing and segregating the records to prevent disclosure to anyone
else. (citations omitted)) (footnotes omitted).
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expungement proceeding under state law,251 courts have found
that news stories, now no longer relevant in the public domain,
can continue to pester individuals.252 As a result, even if the
law permits a person whose record has been expunged to mis-
represent his past,253 they still have the potential for their
previous misdeeds to haunt them long after serving their crim-
inal sentences.254
Actions have been taken in the United States to solve these
issues. The Second Chance Act255 aimed to improve employ-
ment outcomes for people returning to communities after incar-
ceration; the legislation authorizes federal grants to govern-
ment agencies and nonprofit organizations to provide support
strategies and services designed to reduce recidivism by im-
proving outcomes for people returning from prisons, jails, and
juvenile facilities.256 However, success rates (defined as gain-
ing employment) have so far trailed other civilian popula-
tions,257 suggesting that more action is necessary.
Following the European Unions (EU) recognition of the
right to be forgotten, California saw the need for more action
and enacted its own version of the requirement, though lim-
251. See Adam Liptak, Expunged Criminal Records Live to Tell Tales, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 17, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/17/us/17expunge.html
(In 41 states, people accused or convicted of crimes have the legal right to
rewrite history. They can have their criminal records expunged, and in theory
that means that all traces of their encounters with the justice system will dis-
appear.).
252. See, e.g., Rzeznik v. Chief of Police of Southhampton, 373 N.E.2d 1128,
1132 (Mass. 1978) (stating that a similar law did not purport completely to
erase the fact of a prior criminal conviction); Kenny, 15 A.3d at 31516 (allow-
ing continued dissemination of expunged information via campaign materials);
Martin v. Griffin, No. CV 990586133S, 2000 WL 872464, at *12 (Conn. Super.
Ct. June 13, 2000) (The erasure statute operates in the legal sphere, not the
historical sphere.).
253. See, e.g., Kenny, 15 A.3d at 316.
254. Hearst Co., 777 F.3d at 553 (Reasonable readers understand that
some people who are arrested are guilty and that others are not. Reasonable
readers also know that in some cases individuals who are arrested will even-
tually have charges against them dropped. Reporting Martins arrest without
an update may not be as complete a story as Martin would like, but it implies
nothing false about her.).
255. Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008).
256. Second Chance Act, CSG JUST. CTR., http://csgjusticecenter.org
/nrrc/projects/second-chance-act/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2015).
257. Megan Woolhouse, Offering Ex-Convicts a Hand Up After Prison,
BOSTON GLOBE (Apr. 19, 2015), http://www.bostonglobe.com/business
/2015/04/18/going-straight-short-time-change-for-lifetime/C5kvj0yTCt8QlB
8R9HK4oK/story.html.
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ited to the states residents who are minors.258 The California
law became effective January 1, 2015, and applies to websites,
social media sites, mobile apps and other online services.259
The law allows for minors to request and obtain the removal of
certain content from public view that they have submitted to a
website, app or other online service.260 A similar right should
be debated for ex-criminals who have served their time, and
simply want to improve their chances to obtain employment,
housing, or other necessary living necessities. I propose, that
considering the nature, quality, quantity, and historical and
sociocultural context that genetic information contains,261 it is
time to consider that expanding this right to be forgotten may
be a great idea.
4. Is the Right to Be Forgotten Un-American?
Internationally, Google is expressing mixed managerial
implementations of this obligationcomplying with requests
but arguing they should not or maybe do not have to comply.262
Here in the United States, the Supreme Court gives the free-
speech rights of publishers more weight, and allows publica-
258. Boris Segalis & Susan Ross, California Enacts Right to Be Forgotten
for Minors, NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT LLP (Jan. 14, 2015),
http://www.dataprotectionreport.com/2015/01/california-enacts-right-to-be-
forgotten-for-minors/.
259. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22580!22581; Segalis & Ross, supra note
258.
260. Segalis & Ross, supra note 258.
261. See supra Part I.
262. Compare Peter Fleischer, Implementing a European, Not Global,
Right to Be Forgotten, GOOGLE: EUR. BLOG (July 30, 2015),
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tion even of embarrassing material as long as it was legally ob-
tained.263 This said, free speech has contextual limits,264 but
balancing rights and competing interests of privacy, surveil-
lance, freedom of information, and censorship is not a new legal
issue nor is it impossible to cure.265 The Second Circuit has ex-
pressly noted that facts, from a previous court process cannot
be erased.266 But, the Supreme Court has stated that certain
categories of information implicate privacy concerns far be-
yond those implicated by the search of [physical effects] when
the information differ[s] in both a quantitative and a qualita-
263. Williams, supra note 3.
264. See What Does Free Speech Mean?, U.S. CTS.,
http://www.uscourts.gov/educational-resources/get-involved/constitution-
activities/first-amendment/free-speech.aspx (last visited Oct. 16, 2015) (Free-
dom of speech includes the right: Not to speak (specifically, the right not to
salute the flag). West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943). Of students to wear black armbands to school to protest a war (Stu-
dents do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate.). Tinker
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to convey political messages. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). To con-
tribute money (under certain circumstances) to political campaigns. Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). To advertise commercial products and professional
services (with some restrictions). Virginia Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Con-
sumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350
(1977). To engage in symbolic speech, (e.g., burning the flag in protest). Texas
v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310
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(2007).); see also Kent Greenfield, The Limits of Free Speech, ATLANTIC (Mar.
13, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/the-limits-of-
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tive sense,267 and thereby requires extra government proce-
dures to protect individual rightssuch as, in this case, a war-
rant to search a cellular telephone.268 It is not a stretch to anal-
ogize the nature, quality, and quantity of data that is online or
in a cell phone to that of DNA, as some commentators have
done.269 Further, since expungement of DNA data may not be
feasible, and since this data may not really implicate issues of
the First Amendment,270 perhaps it is possible for a narrowly
created government remedy to provide a Right to Be Forgot-
ten for solely genetic information erasure.
III. CONCLUSION: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND
MOVING FORWARD
This paper has presented the legal issues around the mass
collection, storage, and use of DNA information from an array
of perspectives to help illustrate the legal nuances with creat-
ing the Precision Medicine Initiative. This note now moves to
rationalize how to fix them with a number of different ideas.
As a litigation strategy, courts, akin to those in the Euro-
pean Union, should consider more equitable remedies as valid
when considering a petition for removal of DNA data. Consider-
ing that Google Spain arose from a cause of action for an in-
junction, and subsequently, an equitable remedy was granted,
it would be logical to assume a similar cause of action and
strategy could be tried for DNA-related data.271 Further, it may
be more logical to assume that when DNA information is dis-
closed (unless tangible damages could be calculated or there
was some element of slander, libel, or fraud), an equitable rem-
edy would be sufficiently tailored to the various parties inter-
ests. Further, by omission of the expressly monetary compo-
nent of this remedy, courts would forgo those who have solely
financial incentives for bringing a lawsuit. Finally, allowing
this express public policy rationale could incentivize both pri-
267. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 248889 (2014).
268. Id. at 2493.
269. See generally Sebastian Anthony, Harvard Cracks DNA Storage,
Crams 700 Terabytes of Data into a Single Gram, EXTREMETECH (Aug. 17,
2012, 10:22 AM), http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/134672-harvard-
cracks-dna-storage-crams-700-terabytes-of-data-into-a-single-gram (discussing
the amount of data that can be contained in DNA).
270. See supra Section II.E.iii.
271. See Google Spain SL, 2014 E.C.R. 317, ¶¶ 89, 9899.
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vate and public actors to follow modern principles of bioethics
when dealing with personal genetic data.
As a legislative strategy, Congress should pass a law to
adopt a Right to Be Forgotten solely for the context of DNA
information. Such a right would not remove other sorts of in-
formation that could be linked back to a person, like those cur-
rently used in law enforcement to establish probable cause and
allow for a warrant to be obtained to investigate newly found
criminal activity.272 As with the Health Information Privacy
Awareness Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, or the Genetic
Information Non-Discrimination Act, Congress has shown its
ability to pass a law to create a black box of protected infor-
mation.273 For Genetics, it would make sense for Congress to
allow a narrowly tailored, solely contextual Right to Be For-
gotten pertaining to just DNA information. As a result, those
harmed by these issues could remove any and all traces of this
information, and appease those concerned with preservation of
civil liberties. This process may differ depending on if the DNA
was collected in a civil or criminal context; civil forgetting
may be implemented immediately, whereas criminal forget-
ting may be subject to a more formal process of expungement
and administrative review to ensure law enforcement needs are
preserved. Hopefully, given the increased volume, velocity, and
variety of personal data that exists, removing DNA information
stored in CODIS (or other criminal databases) after a period of
time (assuming a criminal investigation has been closed or af-
ter some Congressionally defined period) would be optimal.
Ideally, limiting the perpetuity of stored DNA information
should be possible in a way that balances civil rights to privacy
and civil liberties to speak and publish information freely.
As an administrative strategy, federal agencies, like the
Department of Justice or Department of Health and Human
Services, should track public and private DNA data as a safe-
guard. In conjunction with the previous policy argument, since
DNA information can be disclosed to third-parties, the federal
government should manage a list that has participants data to
decrease concerns involving improper use of DNA data. By
adopting this process, the federal government could give any
participant who wishes to be forgotten, the ability to know
272. See supra Section II.C.
273. See, e.g., The Privacy Rule, supra note 18; Genetic Information Dis-
crimination, supra note 19.
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who to contact to remove traces of their genetic information. To
make these reporting requirements work, state data collection
of DNA should be reported to the federal government in order
to manage and track where participants genetic information is
located. Given their recent history of inaction, if Congress is
unable to come to consensus on this right, a more narrowly tai-
lored, administrative remedy could be crafted by the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services or Department of Justice
to remove or enforce a removal of genetic information; this said,
this remedy would be severely limited to the jurisdiction of the-
se agencies.
Finally, the federal government should create a unified
process to notify researchers, or other third parties using genet-
ic information, when a former participant opts to remove their
information. By having this centralized process, barriers to re-
moving third party information will be minimized, though not
completely mitigated. And by placing this burden on the gov-
ernment, as compared to citizens, participants will be better
able to remove information, and government will be better able
to police those who violate non-compliance with these policies.
Overall, the right to genetic privacy, and further, the right
for a genetic Right to Be Forgotten offers a ripe conflict that
will need to be considered soon by courts, elected officials, and
public policymakers. Considering the historical turmoil over
decision-making based on genetic information, modern bioethi-
cal concerns, and a myriad of privacy and genetic-specific laws
orbiting the regulation of genetic information, a Right to Be
Forgotten seems like a logical step. Further, since manage-
ment of certain types of information (and especially genetic in-
formation) have been contextually limited over the course of
Supreme Court jurisprudence, federal and state laws, and ad-
ministrative regulations, it makes sense for the upcoming Pre-
cision Medicine Initiative to spearhead progress in addressing
privacy concerns and allowing for participants to make mean-
ingful choices regarding the use of their individual genetic in-
formation. Though ambitious, this logical conclusion would be a
step in the right direction for American privacy rights.
